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# West Europe Report

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16 December 1982

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2074

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## BRIEFS

EEC SOVIET GAS FINANCING--It is possible that Greece may be financed by the EEC so the Soviet natural gas pipeline through Bulgaria and Romania can be extended or branched out to our country. This appraisal was made by Minister of Energy and Natural Resources E. Kouloumbis following his return from Brussels where he took part in the EEC energy ministers' council. Among other things, the council discussed the politically sensitive issue of securing the supply of natural gas to the Community from the Soviet Union and expressed the opinion that the prospects are optimistic. It was stated that the communities' unity on this issue is solid, while it is expected that the reservations (and measures) expressed by the United States against the pipeline will be renounced very soon. Operation is anticipated to begin in 1990 and will be in full production in 1993, covering 17 to 18 percent of the community's energy needs. [Excerpt] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 13 Nov 82 p 15] 9247

COKE-PETROLEUM PROJECT--The unit for coke-petroleum production which was announced a few days ago by Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis will be achieved soon. According to yesterday's information, the Vardinogiannis company will have an 85-percent share in the investment and the unit will be established next to the "Motor Oil" refinery in Agioi Theodoroi. The total investment will be 130 to 150 million dollars. According to the same information, the unit will process 1,200,000 tons of mazut and produce about 150,000 tons of coke, as well as light petroleum products. One of the fuels it will produce will be mixed with benzine and expel its octanes; thus, the benzine will contain no lead, a basic element currently causing air pollution. [Text] [Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 12 Nov 82 p 2] 9247

ASPROPYRGOS REFINERY INVESTMENTS--The Aspropyrgos Refinery has recently made important investments. At the same time it secured Romania's technological cooperation in the energy sector as a result of the recent trip to Bucharest by Energy Minister Kouloumbis. The investment for improving the quality of mazut has been effectively efficient since 1 October and as of now the industries in the Attiki basin are using mazut containing 0.7 percent sulfur. This mazut is produced under strict specifications and pollutes the environment the least. With this same investment the state refinery also is producing mazut at minimum cost, while another investment was made for transforming the excess mazut into light fuels such as liquid gas, gasoline and diesel oil and for changing the by-product coke into electrodes for aluminum. [Excerpt] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Nov 82 p 9] 7520



FUEL PRICES UP--Finance Minister D. Koulourianos let it be understood yesterday that the prices for both gasoline and diesel will go up. He avoided saying by how much or when these items will be increased in price, but he did say that the fuel products management account showed a deficit. It is certain that the price of gasoline (both regular and super) will be increased much more while that of diesel will be smaller in order to avoid an increase in the transportation cost of fuels for home heating. The increase in the price of mazut will be smaller still because this fuel is used by the Public Power Corporation. A large increase in the price of mazut would increase proportionally the production cost of industrial products which in turn would raise the cost of living. /Text/ /Athens  
TA NEA in Greek 19 Nov 82 p 187 7520

CSO: 3521/84

## ENERGY MINISTER ANNOUNCES PLANS FOR COAL DISTRICT-HEAT PLANTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Nov 82 p 12

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] About 25 coal-fired district heating plants and 10 or so peat-fired plants will be built over the next few years. That was announced by Birgitta Dahl, minister of energy, on Tuesday. The government and the municipalities will draw up the plans jointly. The oil tax will be increased by 13 kronor per cubic meter next year.

The coal-fired plants will generally be located along the coast to facilitate the transportation of coal, while the peat-fired plants must be located in the vicinity of the peat moors.

As a rule, it can be expected that the coal-fired plants will be built in coastal municipalities that have a Social Democratic majority. Several big municipalities, chief among them Stockholm and Goteborg, had a Social Democratic majority in the election.

The peat-fired plants will be suitable in Smaland, among other places.

The location of the projects will not be definitely decided until the process of circulating the project "Coal, Health, and Environment" for comment has been completed. The investigation work on that project is to be completed in the spring or winter of 1983.

The nonsocialist government submitted a bill last spring placing stricter rules on coal-fired power plants and peat-fired plants, but it was rejected by the Social Democrats and Conservatives.

The emission standards that will apply to the planned coal- and peat-fired power plants will not be established until after the current investigation of the health risks presented by coal has been completed.

## District Heating

The government's energy plans call for investing in district heating systems that will quickly increase employment in this country. The development of district heating will take place in three stages.

The first stage involves investments for expanding the district heating distribution system. Improved district heating loans are being proposed as a way of increasing economic aid to the municipalities. A grant amounting to 10 percent will also be provided for investments in the distribution network if the purchase orders are issued during 1983. A total of 300 million kronor is being earmarked for this purpose.

The second stage will involve investments in about 25 new coal-fired power plants and about 10 peat-fired plants. Information is needed quickly to allow Swedish industry a chance at competing for the orders.

The expansion plans also include about 100 big heat pumps of about 15 megawatts and a large number of smaller heat pumps.

The heat pumps convert about 1 unit of heat into 3 units.

To keep future purification requirements for coal- and peat-fired power plants from being held up by environmental requirements, a special fund is being set up for desulfurizing plants.

#### Gas Studied

According to the energy policy's goals, peat will account for between 6 and 11 terawatt-hours in 1990. Planning in the area of peat is lagging, so a subsidy amounting to 25 percent of the total cost of peat-fired plants is being proposed.

The government will also clarify the future of gas. This concerns both the Southern Gas project from Denmark and the gas pipelines from Norway and the Soviet Union. The Southern Gas project is in full swing, and studies concerning Russian gas should be complete by the end of this year.

In a third stage, the heat-producing plants will be combined with reaction-turbine plants for the production of electricity. Reaction turbines will be needed when the dismantling of nuclear power begins in the 21st century.

A special energy procurement delegation will be set up to help industry and the municipalities. That delegation will analyze investment plans by the municipalities and by producers of energy equipment.

Part of the program will be paid for by the so-called excess profit tax on older electric power plants, which we reported earlier. The government is also proposing that the special oil tax be raised from 80 to 93 kronor per cubic meter. The price of oil is now considerably above 1,000 kronor per cubic meter, so the increase, as a percentage, is moderate. In all, the tax will bring in a couple of hundred million kronor per year.

## PAPER DISCUSSES MERITS OF PLAN FOR DISTRICT-HEATING PLANTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial by Olle Alsen: "Heat From Afar and Cold Close at Hand"]

[Text] As you make your bed, so you must lie in it. Birgitta Dahl, the new minister of energy, announced yesterday at the Gas Company Association's annual meeting in Stockholm that we have had an "uncontrolled" conversion from oil to electricity for heating purposes. She said: "That may hamper an expansion of district heating systems as well as the introduction of new technology and alternative energy sources."

That, of course, was what "Line 3" and the People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power had warned against. It is true that electric heat will never replace any major portion of our oil imports, as people were led to believe during the oil crisis and before the referendum. Even with the extreme boost that electric heat has received, it will account for only 15 or 17 percent of the expected oil substitution (that is, perhaps 1.5 million tons of oil) by 1990.

That is far less than the total of 9 or 10 million tons of oil per year that are being eliminated or replaced by domestic fuel and such things. As a rescuer from our oil difficulties, electricity and electric heat have always been overestimated, and that is no accident: it was the result of public relations ballyhoo by the supporters of nuclear power. But all the same, the explosion in the use of electric heat has just those disadvantages that Birgitta Dahl is now drawing attention to. And others besides.

Currently spreading through the State Power Board and the electric power companies is a quiet and restrained panic at the possibility that the excessively quick conversion to electric heat may cause the electric power nets to collapse during the winter peaks. Now the brakes are being applied: people are being warned not to get rid of their oil furnaces, and in some places, extra fees amounting to thousands of kronor are being charged for new electric heating systems, while the waiting period is often very long.

But many people are already caught in the trap. In the 1960's and 1970's, hundreds of thousands of new home builders were enticed into investing in direct electricity as the only source of heat in private homes. It was cheaper for the sellers to avoid installing fireplaces, furnaces, and distribution



systems for district heating. And the homeowners believed promises that electricity would become steadily cheaper thanks to nuclear power.

Now they sit there--those detached and row houses--and over half a million households are being shocked with the news that the power companies intend to jack up electricity rates within a few years to about 55 ore per kilowatt-hour on winter weekdays. It is coldest when it gets dark.

The heads of the electric power companies say: "But that involves only about 5,000 kilowatt-hours. And bear in mind that current becomes cheaper on winter nights and on weekends. Not to mention the summertime!"

"Thanks a lot," says the mother who sits at home with small children all week long in the winter and shivers. "Thanks a lot that we can afford to have decent heat on weekends."

Those who have only direct electricity are now getting the somewhat cynical advice to freeze a little on winter days--or to buy a wood stove to get through the coldest periods. What luck that the efforts by some authorities to ban wood stoves in the suburbs were stopped last year. But unfortunately, by then they had managed to knock out most of the industry with talk about the poor economics and environmental risks of some wood stoves--do the resources exist for a comeback?

Rate differentials for electricity based on the season and time of day or night, which the power companies now want to push through--so that if possible, they can avoid an unreasonably big investment in distribution networks and power stations to get them through the extreme peakloads in winter--are naturally sensible. Especially since the hump in electric heat being forced on us by the nuclear power effort is a temporary phenomenon.

But it does leave half a million households in the lurch. There they sit, stuck with direct electricity and no alternatives. And even if many others can satisfy their heating requirements on winter days--when current is extremely expensive--with stored-up heat and so on, the individual savings per household are not likely to help much if at the same time, electric heat is tripled from half a million to perhaps 1.5 million private homes. The dilemma remains on the national level, and the power industry has brought it on itself.

Despite the obstacles that the so-called uncontrolled expansion of electric heat is placing in the way of plans by both the power plants and the government, the new government is counting on a big expansion in district heating. In the emergency plan presented today, the energy sector accounts for over half of the 3-billion-kronor package. Energy will become more or less the same mainspring for progress that housing construction was in the 1960's. With government subsidies of 300 million kronor, the hope is that the municipalities will invest up to 3 billion kronor in more district heating plants.

That is often profitable, no doubt, but there should be more investment in low-powered heating systems that can be adapted more easily to future solar heating, domestic fuels, and so on. But can the municipalities finance such

a program? And look out for the danger that the 700 million kronor in loans that the government wants to provide for investment in energy equipment may tempt us to buy too big a suit again, just as we did in connection with nuclear power.

It remains a fact that the conserved and most effectively used kilowatt-hour is by far the cheapest--and the cleanest from the environmental standpoint.

11798

CSO: 3650/38

## TALKS HELD ON ICELAND, GREENLAND, FAEROES TRADE TIES

Reykjavic MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Nov 82 p 35

[Text] A meeting was held in Copenhagen on 26 October 1982 by a committee of MP's intending to work towards increased trade between Iceland, the Faeroes and Greenland. The Icelandic delegates to the meeting were Pall Petursson, Arni Gunnarsson and Stefan Jonsson; Faeroese delegates were Jogvan Sundstein, Atli Dam, Pteur Reinert, Johan Djurhus, Agnar Nilsen and Sigurd J. Jakobsen. No representatives came from Greenland this time. This was the first meeting of the committee members; drafts for the committee's working rules were drawn up.

The chief topic of discussion was cultural matters, with much thought given to increased cooperation between the nations in this area. Language teaching was discussed, as well as news services, interlibrary loans, bilateral student trips, and possibly the foundation of an Icelandic-Faeroese cultural fund.

It came out at the meeting that personal relationships between the Faeroese and the Icelanders had fallen off recently, partially because Faeroese seamen are uncertain about fishing near Iceland.

Much of the discussion at the meeting dealt with relations between the nations in the area of fishing. There was much talk about the Faeroese salmon fisheries. Other topics were hake and capelin fishing, fish sales procedures in the respective countries, fishing industries and fish processing training centers, at which point the idea was brought up that a ground rule in the life of both nations was that the inhabitants must learn to take care of the resources available to them.

The next topic of discussion was the common danger threatening both nations, resulting from a multitude of arbitrary environmental situations occurring in the North Atlantic. The delegates expressed their concern relative to the stockpiling of nuclear armaments on and in the ocean.

Mutual needs of the two nations in the area of energy were also discussed. Transportation between the nations was also discussed; that explains why it was considered a good idea to hold this meeting in Copenhagen. It was decided to hold another meeting soon, this time with the Greenlanders participating.

9584

CSO: 3626/12

## IRAQI BOYCOTTING OF GREEK SHIPPING CHARGED

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 13 Nov 82 p 15

[Article by Giannis Fytras]

[Text] Iraq has launched a boycott against the Greek flag; this has created serious problems for Piraeus shipping companies. According to information from shipping circles, Iraq is giving credits to state organizations, but with the condition that Greek ships not be loaded with Iraqi state cargo, and it is calling the Greek flag a flag of convenience.

Minister of Merchant Marine G. Katsifaras, who was asked about this, stated that he has already informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so it can make a protest. He added that during the commerce minister's recent visit to Iraq, this issue was examined with the Iraqi representatives and he stressed that this policy is unacceptable.

Finally, Mr. Katsifaras said the issue will be solved decisively by the delegation which will go to Iraq for this purpose.

Piraeus shipping circles did not hide their anxieties about the possible circulation of a blacklist against Greek ships by other Arab countries which might copy Iraq's example.

Relative to this, it is stressed that the Greek Government must proceed urgently to intense protests to the Iraqi Government because this incomprehensible policy is particularly painful under the current difficult conditions.

It should be noted that, aside from Greek ships, Iraq also prohibits the loading of state cargo on ships which bear the flags of Cyprus, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Panama and Senegal.

9247

CSO: 3521/81



## LIBYAN STATEMENT SEEN OPENING NO NEW DOORS IN DEBT REPAYMENT

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 44 4 Nov 82 p 60

[Article by Giannis Dimitriadis]

[Text] Recently a statement of the Arab-Greek Chamber of Commerce and Development relating to the status of Greek-Libyan economic and technical exchanges was made public. In this statement, it is stressed characteristically that "...It is not conceivable (or allowable) for some problems which have arisen in recent months to influence Greek-Libyan commercial and economic relations which have developed so sensationally in recent years."

In fact, the Libyan representative to Athens, Mr. Gamudi, stressed that whoever has problems--either exporters or technical companies--should visit him and talk to him about their problems.

Nevertheless, we perceive that this text of the Chamber contains falsehoods and has other purposes. First, it maintains that the problems have existed only a few months when, in fact, the problems concerned began at the beginning of the summer of 1981. Second, they are not "some problems," but simply the fact alone that Libya refuses to keep its promises and pay for Greek products, technology and works which have already been carried out. Third, the Chamber's statement cannot relate to moral issues of the style "it is not allowable" because, of course, it is not allowable to refuse payments (and, in fact, at the same time threaten Greek parties, enterprises and the country about the policy they exercise or the claims they have).

Mr. Gamudi, known for his interventions in Greek domestic and foreign policy, wants representatives of the companies to which Libya owes money to drop by his office to settle their affairs. Do we have to remind him that a host of reports about these incidents--some have been submitted two or three times--have been in his office for many months now? Perhaps Mr. Gamudi has heretofore frequently refused to receive representatives of Greek companies on similar matters?

We recall that just a few months ago, on the occasion of the American exercises in the Gulf of Syrti (which are unquestionably international waters), Libya threatened our country with catastrophe because there are American bases on Crete. Just a short time ago, it chased boats of Kalymnos sponge-fishers and often seized them. It has created many problems because the pilot who had sought asylum was not handed over to them. Now, however, suddenly everything is going well. So well that we accept a visit of their navy. So well that all the problems are solved.

The problem is economic. In recent years, Libya "has granted" far more than its earnings from oil allowed. This happened because of the cessation of high-interest loans which were based on manufactured oil. With this policy, in the last five years, it financed the adventurous risks in support of Amin Dada in Uganda, the efforts to overthrow Nimeiri in Sudan and the invasion in Chad. Moreover, in this way it received huge quantities of Soviet war materiel and western military technology. Furthermore, Qadhafi organized his groups abroad to persecute Libyans with contrary opinions.

Sometimes, however, the price of oil fell. The cost for services and imported items rose. And Libya has been unable for a very long time to pay its debts which, according to recent press publications, apply not only to the western countries but also to the Soviet Union.

Under international economic pressures and facing the danger of a substantial bankruptcy, Libya is being obliged to change its tough policy and to practice other more diplomatic methods which will allow it some new margins, in terms of time, for transactions. A result of this change is Mr. Gamudi's appeal for Greek-Libyan economic differences to be solved through talks.

Perhaps this is an opportunity for the Greek businesses which are owed many millions of dollars to collect. But it must not be considered a policy of open doors on Libya's part to our country. Because we must not forget that Colonel Qadhafi's country, among other things, partially supports Denktash on Cyprus' occupied territory and is working closely with Turkey, in the frameworks of the Arab world, to isolate Greece.

9247

CSO: 3521/81

## IMPROVED JANUARY-AUGUST BALANCE OF TRADE NOTED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 4 Nov 82 pp 1, 15

/Text/ The 8-month period from January to August showed a significant improvement in the balance of trade as well as in the balance of current payments.

Specifically, the deficit in the balance of trade was held at 3,788 million dollars, while last year it was 4,321 million. In other words, there was a reduction of 12.3 percent.

Total imports were restrained and the expenditures in foreign currency came to 6,470 million dollars compared to 7,552 million last year (a reduction of 14.3 percent). Imports in the private sector showed a small decrease (2.3 percent), while the imports of petroleum products showed a decrease of 37.9 percent.

The receipts of foreign currency from exports of goods were reduced by 17 percent and came to 2,682 million dollars. The exports of the private sector were reduced by 14.8 percent and came to 2,328 million dollars.

During the 8-month period there was a continued reduction of miscellaneous income (7 percent), a reduction that comes mainly from reductions in income from tourism, maritime sources and immigrants.

Foreign currency from tourism in our country came to 974 million dollars, a reduction of 18.4 percent from last year. There was an intensely continued reduction of income from maritime sources (11.6 percent) that is due to the international maritime crisis that naturally affects our merchant marine.

The foreign currency sent to our country during this 8-month period by Greek immigrants was reduced by 8.5 percent and came to 632 million dollars. This reduction is due to the economic crisis that plagues the countries where they are working.

It is worth noting that the receipts from EEC funds came to 260 million dollars compared to 14 million last year. Miscellaneous payments by the country came to the same levels as last year, specifically 1,333 million dollars.

Expenses for travel abroad increased by 2.8 percent and came to 221 million dollars. Furthermore, the expense for services abroad increased by 9.5 percent and came to 543 million dollars.

The flow of capital from abroad for investments, for the purchase of real estate and for loans to banks was reduced by 22.6 percent and totaled 1,133 million dollars. Investment capital that was imported in our country reached 203 million dollars, the capital for the purchase of real estate reached 252 million dollars and the deposits of Greeks abroad came to 119 million (a reduction of 33.9 percent). Finally, the foreign exchange reserves on 31 August were 1,088 million dollars.

9346

CSO: 3521/65



## PUBLIC ENTERPRISES' DEFICIT FOR 1982 NOTED

Athens I AVGI in Greek 6 Nov 82 p 1

Excerpts The deficit for public enterprises and organizations for 1982 comes to 76,556 million drachmas.

According to information provided yesterday by Deputy Minister of National Economy A. Georgiadis, the deficit increased by 57 percent since 1981, while in 1981 it increased by 292 percent compared to 1980.

Georgiadis emphasized the government's effort to keep the deficits low, but did not provide any information on the possibility of raising prices in public enterprises. He said that the price policy is being examined in the framework of fiscal policy and the decisions will be announced together with the budget.

According to tables provided by Georgiadis, the public enterprises and organizations totally began to show deficits in 1980 with a deficit of 12,405 million drachmas, continuing in 1981 with a deficit of 48,600 million drachmas to reach 76.6 billion in 1982.

The two large social security organizations have shown the greatest deficits--IKA Social Insurance Foundation with 26,185 million drachmas (as opposed to 12,127 million last year) and OGA Farm Insurance Organization with 19,460 million drachmas (as opposed to 10,093 million in 1981). These great deficit increases are related to the pension increases in 1982.

The OAS Urban Communications Organization follows with a deficit of 13,676 million drachmas (as opposed to 7,982 million last year). According to appraisals, this makes possible a decision to increase the fare prices in urban transportation.

There are also deficits by OSE Railways Organization of Greece of 7.7 billion drachmas and by Olympic Airways of 5.5 billion and also by EAV Greek Aircraft Industry of 7.8 billion drachmas.

Next are ELTA Greek Posts with 2,647 million, EVDAR expansion unknown with 1,350 million, EOT Greek Tourist Organization with 960 million, EOMEX Hellenic Organization of Medium and Small-Size Enterprises and Handicrafts with 400 million, IGME Institute for Geological and Mineral Research with 240 million, and ERT Greek Radio and Television with 162 million.

On the positive side, there is a profit of 1,021 million drachmas by DEP /Public Petroleum Corporation/, of 694 million by the Aspropyrgos Refineries, of 852 million by OTE /Greek Telecommunications Organization/, 30 million by DEI /Public Power Corporation/, 5.5 billion by OEK /Greek Housing Organization/, and 300 million of OLP /Piraeus Port Authority/.

Georgiadis also mentioned that there were 134,754 employees in the public enterprises and organizations in 1982, an increase of .9 percent over 1981.

New positions totaling 6,592 are being provided for 1982. That is an increase of 4.9 percent in personnel.

9346

CSO: 3521/65

## WAR FIRM UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Athens I AVGI in Greek 6 Nov 82 p 6

/Excerpts/ PYRKAL will come under government control, according to an agreement between the government and the representatives of this over-indebted company. It was made known that early next week, under pressure by the workers, the government will sign the final agreement to put the factory back into operation since its shutdown about 1½ months ago. For this purpose, the new administration of the company will be appointed by the government on Tuesday after the books are closed and certain legal matters are taken care of. At least two representatives of the workers will participate in the new administration, one from the Eleusis factory and one from the Ymittos factory.

Referring to the terms of the agreement, a responsible government official stated yesterday that the "socialization" of PYRKAL will not burden the public.

After successive meetings yesterday, the government and the representatives of the Bodosakis institution came to the respective agreements. Participants among others were Minister of National Economy G. Arsenis, Minister to the Premier A. Koutsogiorgas, Deputy Minister of National Economy D. Dimosthenopoulos, National Bank Director Panagopoulos and other senior officials.

9346

CSO: 3521/65

## INFLATION, SALARY STATISTICS CITED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 3 Nov 82 p 1

/Text/ The government managed to stop the decline of the economy. Now there is a basis for the optimistic outlook that 1983 will be a productive year and we will have more positive results.

This statement was made yesterday in parliament by Deputy Minister of National Economy D. Dimosthenopoulos in answer to a question by KKE Deputy K. Kappos. More specifically, Dimosthenopoulos said:

"The year 1981 closed with an inflationary increase of 24.9 percent and in 1982 the PASOK government managed to compress it to 22 percent and for the first time in many decades there is no increase anticipated in expenses. This is a positive step in stabilizing the economy."

He later dealt with the subject of inflation and its lowering. That is an "accomplishment" when:

Wages and salaries of workers were increased up to 55 percent. Characteristically, the income of salaried workers increased by 27.7 percent.

The participation of salaried workers' income to the total income of the urban area of the economy came to 55 percent, while it barely reached 52.8 percent in 1981.

The hourly rate of pay of industrial workers will be increased by 36 percent this year, while those working in the public sector increased their income by 31 percent in 1982.

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CSO: 3521/65

## BRIEFS

EEC PAYMENTS FOR 1982—The net gain for our country from dealings with the EEC Funds will come to 50 billion drachmas by the end of the year. Specifically, according to yesterday's announcement by Deputy Minister of Finance Pan. Roumeliotis, the total 1982 receipts will reach about 63 billion drachmas, while payments will reach 14 billion. Also, according to Roumeliotis' account of dealings with the EEC for the 10-month period from January through October, the receipts from EEC Funds increased to 50,018.10 million drachmas or by 350 percent compared to 11,104.4 million drachmas during the corresponding 1981 period.

/Text/ /Athens TA NEA in Greek 3 Nov 82 p 18/ 9346

CSO: 3521/65



## OPPOSITION TO TANKER PLAN UNITES GREENLAND, CANADA ESKIMOS

## Greenland Government Leads Opposition

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Nov 82 p 49

[Article by Jon Lie: "Icebreaking Supertankers Threaten Eskimo Culture"]

[Text] The search for gas and oil is creating problems in the politically and ecologically sensitive areas of the Arctic. For a number of years in Canada they have worked on a project--Arctic Pilot Project [APP]--which is for the transport of gas found on Melville Island in the far north, down through Lancaster Sound and Davis Strait to Newfoundland. Two icebreaking supertankers will be built which will be able to force their way through 2.5 meters thick sea ice and make the 10,000 kilometer long round trip in 33 days in the winter. So far 600 million dollars have been invested in APP, and the total will come to 2.5 billion. According to development optimists the project can have a cumulative effect of 15 billion dollars on Canada's economy. The problem is not technological, even if APP adherents admit that there are many unsolved problems and that such superships have never been built. The problem between Canada on one side and Greenland and Denmark on the other is that the projected tanker route goes through areas which today and for thousands of years have been the foundation of life for the Eskimos--the Inuits--their hunting culture, and the circumstances of their existence in the world's most inhospitable area.

The concern that noise from 15 annual round trips with icebreaking tankers, straight through the spawning and hunting areas for whale, seal, walrus and polar bear will frighten the animals away, is strong and real in Greenland, where 10,000 hunters along the northwest coast could be affected if the concerns of the pessimists prove to be well-founded. In the worst case the project can cause total cultural and economic collapse in the area. "What is to be done if 20 percent of the country's population is deprived of their

means of living?" they are asking in Nuuk--Godthab. "There is nothing to fall back on. Unlike the Canadians they can not become farmers or lumberjacks. They have only one possibility--hunting and fishing."

APP defends itself against criticism from Greenland, Denmark, and the international Eskimo organization by pointing out that their chosen route goes down the middle of the 200 kilometer wide Davis Strait (which is international waters), and that they have taken every imaginable precaution to protect maritime wildlife as well as the Eskimo people in Greenland and Northeast Canada. They point to the experimental nature of the project, and that they intend to conduct an extensive underwater acoustic research program.

According to a symposium in Toronto, the noise level in Baffin Bay, Davis Strait and along the Labrador coast is already very high because of icebergs falling and the contact between the sea and the edge of the ice. It is admitted that the tankers will increase the noise considerably in a given area for 2-4 hours each time a ship passes, but at the same time it is claimed that there are very few sea animals in the Arctic in the periods when the ice cap is greatest and the sound from icebreakers is most intense.

That is rejected by the Greenlanders, who point to their own experiences as hunters, and the drastic decline in animal stocks and the hunting catch in the vicinity of the mining area at Marmorilik in northwest Greenland after the few times icebreakers have worked the fjord offshore. As an example of how painstaking they are not to create noise which can frighten away animals, Greenland points out the total prohibition of all hunting from snow scooters. In certain areas whale and seal hunting are allowed only from kayaks.

"Promoters of the project have not convinced us that it can be carried out without damaging and perhaps catastrophic consequences for the environment, and therefore for the culture, lifestyle and survival possibilities of the Eskimos," said the Greenland homegovernment, which has unanimously rejected APP.

From previous experience they are skeptical of a development in the Arctic which is exclusively for the benefit of southern industrialized society. APP has in no way met the needs and desires of the Eskimo people, they said in Nuuk.

"We can not accept this type of project in the Arctic. Promoters see the Arctic as a storehouse of treasures for southern society, while we see the Arctic as our home," said the homegovernment people. "When both parties can not agree that the project is safe, we can not accept it. If we did, we would risk losing our home and our means of living. We can not be asked to take such a risk."

In the homegovernment offices at Nuuk they said, "Even if the promoters are ready to prove to the Eskimos that APP is a safe project--and the burden of proof rests entirely on the promoters--the project continues to be a test which will open the way for other projects on such a scale that the

short-term and long-term effects are totally unpredictable according to what we know today. Furthermore we are convinced that it is in the best interests of the Canadian people to protect the Arctic areas against exploitation without sufficient consideration for the environment, and without a thorough analysis beforehand.

#### Polar Peoples Form International Organization

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Nov 82 p 49

[Article by Jon Lie: "Strong Opposition Against New Technology in the Arctic"]

[Text] The Eskimos' own international organization, which includes Eskimo communities in Alaska, Canada and Greenland, but not the Eskimo minority in the Soviet Union, has the subject of the Arctic Pilot Project high on its agenda. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference [ICC] has as its main goal to work across international borders on concrete projects to protect Eskimo interests. They work in education, and on development programs of a political and cultural nature. "Certainly there are differences, but we have more unified interests," they said at ICC. They are trying to create an Arctic policy in all areas, a policy which can resist the blind search for resources which affects all social areas.

"In the last instance it is a question of protecting our culture, our language and our identity," said the president of ICC, Greenlander Hans-Pavia Rosing in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN. The capital Nuuk--Godthab--can stand as a symbol of the meeting between Eskimo culture and European. The meeting place bears the stamp of the strength of the more destructive forces in European culture, and Rosing emphasizes very forcibly the desire that Greenland not be completely Europeanized.

#### Their Own Part Nation?

He said, "But Greenland continues to be so basically different from Europe, and Greenlanders still have so much identity remaining, that there is still something to go on. The cultural meeting has brought impulses with it which if correctly managed can lead to a new Greenland culture. Experience so far indicates that a new generation is coming with new ways of thinking. Previously there have been protests against a new undesirable development on which we had no influence--that caused a greater change and a hate against the Danes for what they had done to Greenland. Today the attitude is more subtle--we see a tendency to accept the situation, roll up the shirtsleeves and make the best of it.

"APP is small in comparison with other possible projects in the Arctic," said Hans-Pavia Rosing. "We have delayed the project, and have certain possibilities of getting it stopped. The odds are not on our side--600 million dollars have already been spent by the Canadians--but if we do not succeed

in stopping APP, by the year 2000 there will be 300 supertankers breaking through the ice from Beaufort eastward through the Northwest Passage and down through the Davis Strait."

Today the technology does not exist to assure transport by ship of the oil and gas which has been discovered in the Northwest Territories. A pipeline over land has been temporarily stopped until the Eskimos' demand for their territorial rights in the Northwest Territories has been decided. There is a recommendation for dividing the Northwest Territories so that the Eskimos will have their own part nation, but that is a long time in the future, according to Hans-Pavia Rosing. An important factor is that oil and gas have been discovered on a federal area, something which can make it an important political/economic weapon for Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the fight against the secessionist tendencies in the western states.

#### Not Get One Cent!

Rosing emphasized that the Eskimos are weak if they oppose one program at a time. "We must work on principles and the long-run," he said. Both ICC, the Greenland homegovernment and the Eskimos in Canada and Alaska must now formulate an Arctic policy which can be approved by next year's ICC general assembly and used as a basis for negotiations with the respective governments. The organization is also seeking consultative status in the UN to strengthen Eskimo issues, but is not a member of the World Council of Indigenous People (WCIP). "We first want to build up our own organization," said Hans-Pavia Rosing. "There are already enough organizational problems confronting the WCIP."

It has been important for the Eskimos to start ICC on their own conditions. The organization is mainly financed by the Eskimos themselves--which means that most of the budget comes from the Greenland homegovernment--but they would very much like to see contributions from funds and governments in the United States, Canada and Denmark. Counterarguments say that such contributions would make the organization vulnerable for pressure from the sources of the financing, but these arguments have little weight. "It is horrible that Canada uses billions on oil development in Eskimo areas, while the Canadian Eskimos do not get one cent to protect their own interests," said Hans-Pavia Rosing.

"We do not want industry and firms who want oil and gas to enter our country over our heads, and without consultation with the people who live in the areas, namely the Eskimos."

#### Total Destruction

"We have experienced our land and our people being exploited. We have become more watchful, and are beginning to realize what is going on. Now we

have finally said stop. Until today the Arctic is one of the few areas in the world which is almost undamaged by industrialization, and therefore one of the least polluted areas of the world. A long-range plan which gives high priority to the protection of the Arctic will in the long run be advantageous for all parties.

"A relatively small population--the Eskimos--have since the beginning of time succeeded in maintaining the balance between people and nature. Do we now want a handful of industries at the risk of the total destruction of this balance? The answer is no," said Hans-Pavia Rosing. "Nobody wants it on his conscience that he has approved a project which does not guarantee full safety for the environment.

"We believe that the consequence would be that the Eskimos, the real protectors of the Arctic, would be deprived of their basis for existence, and that a unique culture would not survive."

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## OeVP'S PROBLEM: DEVELOPING CONCRETE ALTERNATIVES

Vienna PROFIL in German 25 Oct 82 pp 16-19

[Article by Josef Votzi: "What Does the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] Want--Besides Sharing in the Government?--Six Months Before the Next Election the Big Opposition Party Continues To Vacillate Between Cooperation and Confrontation"]

[Text] For some weeks now, small plastic animals have been strewn over his round desk. One squeals if one as much as touches it, another yields to pressure in utter silence, and they are all handy. Vienna's OeVP chairman, Erhard Busek, brought them home from a trip to Italy. In the coming election campaign he plans to introduce one of the small saurian models among the people in this country. As a campaign gift explaining one of his slogans--"Against the Saurians."

When Michael Graff moved into the OeVP secretary general's office this spring, he found there several kilograms of election campaign ammunition. Almost 400 closely printed pages, divided into 7 brochures, entitled the "Austrian Model." In March this year, it had been passed by a party congress in euphoric terms: "The Austrian model serves us as a compass for the change in the political course which we want to implement in the interest of Austria and its future."

Six months before the coming National Council elections, critics outside and inside the OeVP are still asking what in fact the destination of the journey after the "change in course" is supposed to be. "When will the OeVP say in concrete terms just what it wants to do better?" asked KURIER editor-in-chief Gerd Leitgeb in his Sunday column a couple of weeks ago. A little less basic was the headline of a report in OBEROESTERREICHISCHE NACHRICHTEN about the Black [OeVP] reaction to the trade union reproach that the party had to bear part of the blame for the increase in unemployment. It read: "VP is Fidgeting in Its Own Chaps."

Mock deputy Erhard Busek in turn, misses at OeVP headquarters in general a "feel for politics" and deplores the inadequate packaging of existing contents. Styrian Land party Secretary Gerhard Hirschmann declared after a trip through his green province: "Everyone wants the election campaign to be trimmed down to a few tangible alternatives to government policy."

The OeVP has to say what it really wants to do differently in the areas of jobs, environment and housing." He added: "I hope Alois Mock will succeed in the tough struggle with his people."

Since the again unsuccessful elections of 1979, the OeVP leadership has been coming up with ever new slogans. As early as in the fall of the election year, in a closed party meeting, the "independent human being" was born, but today hardly a single Black politician shows up with that wunderkind any longer. There followed the "change in course," a "different policy" and the "Austrian model." "Actually the OeVP suffers from an issue-platform fetishism," diagnoses OeVP scientific spokesman Hienrich Neisser, "while lacking in strategic thinking. An opposition party ought to have seven or eight quite concrete counterpositions" because "the public has a healthy liking for the tangible, and particularly the young people will not be content with general slogans."

However, the way party chief Alois Mock plans to satisfy the desire for clearly formulated alternatives smacks of slogans rather than of tangible things. Friday before last at its fall congress in Graz, the big opposition party came up with five kinds of standing type "to be used by our functionaries again and again, to from party of every speech" (OeVP Secretary General Michael Graff). For example: "Better management instead of debts and waste" or "more nature instead of poison and concrete."

Only rarely does the new election campaign miracle weapon, limited to 18 pages, become truly tangible. "Out with the unnecessary under secretaries, reduce representation expenses by 50 percent, eliminate tax-funded government propaganda," one can read concerning the subject of fiscal policy, for instance. "The number of civil servants can be reduced by 1 percent a year by hiring less new personnel."

The fact that this alone cannot bring about the vociferously demanded budget reform is also being conceded by OeVP politicians. As for social security, party chief Mock in fact issues only the general slogan "Weed it out!" He does not want to commit himself to more than that, saying: "To approach this concretely is up to the government. Turning the arguments around--that is something we cannot allow. We have to have a general political line." And: Neither our national character nor democracy permit radical measures."

OeVP insiders comment on this by saying that the various camps of interests within the party still do not permit a clear political line. The counterprogram which the party, for instance, wanted to televise for political consumers concerning nationalized industry was not properly focused (PROFIL No 45, 1981). Above all, the wing of workers and employees voiced the opinion that the OeVP was allowing itself to be nationalized all too quickly. When Josef Taus proposed a "sector coalition" ["Bereichskoalition"] OeAAB [Austrian Workers and Employees League] Chairman Kohlmaier countered that this was a "strategy of embrace." A joint solution with the government party was advocated primarily by Province Presidents Josef Ratzenboeck and Josef Krainer; after all, it is in Upper Austria and Styria that the majority of the nationalized jobs in jeopardy are located.

Some of the Black province chiefs already half a year ago came out before OeVP bodies in favor of stretching out in time some informal coalition feelers in the direction of the SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party]. "One really ought to talk with those people soon," urged Tirol's Eduard Wallnoefer at a meeting.

A Black in the know reports as follows about the climate of opinion in the higher party ranks: "The circle of those who are thinking about sharing in the government is very large. There are many who believe in a Red-Blue arrangement [between the SPOe and the FPÖe (Austrian Liberal Party)]. And there is a small group which thinks that additional years of opposition would not be the worst thing that could happen since it might demonstrate the continuity of personnel and points of view."

KLEINE ZEITUNG, for one, said that the fall congress of the party, which was meant as an election campaign congress, gave the impression that "Mock is trimming the OeVP for a coalition course." The rest of the speakers, however, said the paper, had made an ambiguous impression, "vacillation by the OeVP between cooperation and confrontation having also become apparent at the fall congress."

Some OeVP people already have their foot in the door leading to power. "There are some who are already seeing themselves behind ministerial desks," says Mock mouthpiece Herbert Vytiska. Another OeVP insider mentions them by name, saying: "Guenther Wiesinger, Fritz Koenig and Robby Graf are already rowing like mad."

Refusing to mention names, party chief Mock describes the general mood as follows: "After the successful result of the convention center plebiscite, on or the other high official already saw himself at the top." Mock confidant Vytiska notes: "Sometimes one had the impression that segments of the party do not stand but sit behind Mock."

The seventh OeVP chairman since 1945 thinks that one can travel the road into a coalition government only this way, however: "Persons harboring illusions are also becoming increasingly sparse among us; the others will respect us only if we become stronger."

But the OeVP is still a great distance away from that. In opinion polls it continues to show its current parliamentary strength of 42 percent. And following its convention center campaign, conducted firmly since the spring the party faces the following phenomenon: In concrete individual questions, its policy, depending on the question, meets with 60 to 70 percent approval in opinion polls, but if voters are asked about their overall political option, they opt against the OeVP.

"This is a fact that I take not of," the new secretary general says succinctly. "Our job is to make the issues a topical one on election day among these two-thirds." According to OeVP Chairman Mock, "it is evident that we cannot conduct an election with the convention center as the sole issue," but "public opinion often takes a long time to hatch."

In the desk of the OeVP secretary general, for instance, for about 4 weeks now a concept has been hatching with which it is believed new voters can still be mobilized. The chairman is to present it in January as "my platform." At present two concrete election campaign pieces of candy are under discussion:

--The promise to raise minimum pensions above the rate of the annual cost-of-living increase--for instance in the form of a minimum amount of several hundred schillings;

--the promise to abolish the trade tax because it impedes investment.

"The platform will include a number of items which go into detail, says OeVP Secretary Graff without going into detail; "Mock will say what he plans to do if the OeVP wins the election." Also as regards the convention center, Graff says, there already exists a clear stand in case the party shares in the government: If the government has not stopped construction by that time, a competition should be conducted among architects after the election to determine what can be done with what has already been built."

Another basic question, according to the two OeVP leaders, has already been adequately answered in case it comes to a share in government: a no as far as Zwentendorf is concerned. With this line, Mock and Graff evidently plan to keep themselves ready for a coalition. Mock deputy Erhard Busek wants the party to take a clearly contrasting stand: "The OeVP should turn its preliminary no concerning Zwentendorf into a 'no because.' A coalition based on the Zwentendorf agreement would not be a viable coalition."

"I am pleased whenever Erhard gives us good advice over the media," Michael Graff says sarcastically in response. "We will deal with it the same way as we handle any citizen's advice, even though he is Federal party chairman." OeVP Chairman Mock comments: "Busek can submit that to the party executive at any time."

The two do not feel quite comfortable about the Green option of the Vienna party chairman. Although Mock the day after the election victory of the Salzburg citizen's list immediately went around with the slogan of the OeVP decimators ("Free Citizen Or Subject") his capacity for retrieval has its limits: "When these ideas become a social alternative with zero growth, or such, I have no sensorium."

In the whole ecology question, says the OeVP's Heinrich Neisser, his party has yet to engage in "a credible debate," which "should be the first step following the elections." But "in the OeVP too few people are taking any chances; we all have already adapted too much. We probably lack a critical component and the readiness to debate in the party." The trauma of coalition conflicts often covers up needed processes of fermentation," Neisser says. "All those who say that we also should be in opposition the next 4 years are perhaps the real optimists."

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## ISSUE OF 'INTERNATIONALIZATION' OF CYPRUS PROBLEM DISCUSSED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 1 Nov 82 p 5

/Excerpt/ The "internationalization" slogan about which much has been said and written has again surfaced recently in a very intense way.

In the past, during the early years of the invasion, "internationalization" had meaning and substance--it was, in fact, created by Turkey itself by its barbarous invasion. The international common opinion and the foreign governments could not remain apathetic in light of the Middle-Age cruelties a supposedly European nation was committing against a small, civilized nation.

It was not wise, however, to believe that this "sensitization" of the foreigners toward Cyprus would be long-lasting. Yet, this is exactly what we did. The spontaneous and so successful internationalization--as we characterized the reaction of the international community to the invasion--inspired the policy of the long-lasting struggle Makarios declared in 1976--a struggle based on the realization that the Turkish troops could not depart from Cyprus easily and that we did not have the power to chase them out by force. A long-lasting effort was necessary, therefore, to force Turkey to withdraw from Cyprus under the moral pressure of the international community.

Substantially, however, such a policy was but wishful thinking and was condemned to failure for the following reasons: first of all, the international outcry against Turkey could not last--as we have already mentioned--as much time and with such intensity as we would have liked in order to ensure the continuation of the long-lasting struggle. Second, the struggle's maximum objective was the removal of the Turkish troops and the return of the refugees to their homes as provided by the UN resolutions. In other words, we wanted to erase all the consequences of the invasion only through the moral pressure against the invader. But the greatest contradiction was that, while through the long-lasting struggle we aimed at the maximum objective, at the same time we agreed to hold /Inter-communal/ talks, a fact which preassumed the recognition of the need for compromise.

Thus, it was expected that the long-lasting struggle would be short-lived as an applied policy. Makarios himself deserted it just before he died by signing the first "summit" agreement with Denktash. Yet while the slogan of the long-lasting struggle ceased to be heard, that of internationalization is being continued.



## TURKISH CENTRAL BANK CREATION GIVES RISE TO FEARS

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 5 Nov 82 p 1

/Text/ Any criticism of the Kremlin's ostrich-like behavior would have no practical meaning. The Soviet Union is a big power and says and does what it wants. Israel invaded Lebanon. Turkey did not invade Cyprus! The common Kyprianou-Breshnev communique condemns the first; it does not mention the latter. So what? Was any new element added? Has the Soviet Union condemned in the past 8 years the Turkish invasion? Why then should it condemn it now? But why, yes why, should we co-sign the non-condemnation..?

But there is also something more comico-tragic. The Soviets invited to Moscow the Cypriot president and the Turkish foreign minister simultaneously in order to avoid in advance any misunderstandings..! In this way the Breshnev-Kyprianou "meeting of the minds" will have as a consequence the Breshnev-Turkmen "meeting of the minds." Yes, what a big power the Soviet Union is... And those who expected something different from the "regular" visit /of Kyprianou/ to Moscow live in another world...

Following the Moscow fiasco--which, as was said, had positive results for the /Cypriot/ grapes and lemons--it is time to be concerned about the course we should follow. Both ourselves and Athens find us in definite deadlocks. The Turks are renewing their threats... We go in different directions and seek adventures. Just one very recent incident gives a measure of the superficial loquaciousness with which our leadership faces the new facts used by the Turks to threaten Cyprus:

The Turks decided to establish their own Central Bank. This constitutes one more fundamental and practical step away from the federated state. Waldheim had proposed the establishment of a central bank for the infrastructure and structure of the federated state. A central bank is the basic characteristic feature of a federated state. By contrast, two central banks are the basic feature of a confederation--the existence, in other words, of two states. This new fact passed almost unnoticed since everyone was compelled to follow the president who was traveling...

The Turks have proved to us that once they take a decision they go ahead with its implementation and if they achieve some new fact they hold on to it. Now we are facing a new accomplished fact and we are trying to cope with it by gobbledygooking, sloganeering, showing off and politico-diplomatic snobbery. The

The question raised is: Can there be internationalization without a long-lasting struggle and if so what would it serve?

The answer is given by the policy Papandreou chartered for reinternationalization. The Greek premier spoke about internationalization in a different meaning. He placed it especially in the European area, at a level of governments, setting as an objective only the removal of the Turkish troops in order to make possible the conduct of meaningful talks between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek premier's "internationalization" was free of the wishful thinking and the Makarios contradictions and could, with proper handling, bring about specific results.

The rest is known. The Kyprianou government at first enthusiastically accepted the discussion of "nationalization," then rejected it following its "alliance" with AKEL based on the "minimum" program. And now, to justify the lack of a substantial policy for the solution of the Cyprus problem, the "alliance" brings again on the scene the internationalization slogan which had accompanied the short-lived "long-lasting struggle."

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presidential trips and the discussions about lemons and grapes are not serious events... They are sad events which underline the irresponsibility with which Cypriot Hellenism is led to new adventures.

The Turks want the whole of Cyprus. The Americans, seeing the way we act, are not about to press Ankara... The Russians are not about to displease it... Guarantor Britain is not disposed to help and guarantor Greece cannot ensure the defense of Cyprus... These are not plain assessments, nor assumptions. They are provocative facts. If they do not deeply stir up certain political leaders here, if these facts do not wake them up, let there be no illusion--none at all. No "friend" is saving Cyprus which started playing Russian roulette again (as is known, the participants in such a game hope that there is no bullet in one of the pistol's chambers).

The responsibilities of the [AKEL-DEKO] "alliance" are heavy. The "alliance" is opposing Athens while leading at the same time the Cypriot government to steady dependence on the Soviet chariot. These two developments coupled with the internal bigotry [the alliance] breeds, create in Cyprus a very dangerous climate. Who can save the situation? The people! The Greeks of Cyprus must wake up, must thwart the "alliance's" plans. If the people fail to do so, they should not blame others for the misfortunes which will befall them!

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## OUTSIZED IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP REGRETTED

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 1 Nov 82 p 3

/Text/ We cannot claim that political life in Cyprus is experienced, nor that during the years of our independence we developed politically because Makarios remained personality-dominated until his death and he expressed the will of the overwhelming majority of our people.

But political life is necessary. The establishment of parties, the presentation and development of ideas, are an inseparable part of our people's life. The political life is the country's mirror at any given moment.

Therefore, if political life in a country is a healthy phenomenon then we should be concerned about its continuation and development. Certain political actions in other countries teach us that we have a long way to go until we reach the desired level /of such life/. One recent political action in another country has provided us with the incentive to make comparisons and to reach the conclusion that as concerns political activity /in Cyprus/ we are still in an underdeveloped state.

For health and other reasons, West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt announced that he had decided to give up the leadership of his strong Social Democratic Party and that, therefore, he did not intend to be a candidate for chancellor in the next general elections which will probably take place next March. Does the Schmidt decision mean that his party--which in the next elections may win a majority and form a government--will be dissolved? Of course not since there are many cadres in his party who will claim its leadership.

When we heard about Schmidt's decision to retire from active political life we immediately thought of the situation in Cyprus, of the Cypriot developments. We wondered: If for any reason the leader of a Cypriot party (with the exception of AKEL) decided or was forced to retire from active political life, what would the fate of his party be?

Let us be more specific. Will there be a Democratic Party /DIKO/ without Spyros Kyprianou? We do not know who among the party's cadres could be his successor. Will there be a Democratic Rally /DISY/ without Glavkos Kliridis? In this case we know of no cadre today who can succeed him. The same troubling questions can

be raised about the Center Union, the United Democratic Union of the Center, the Youth of the Democratic Front and the Pan-Cyprian Restorative Front.

One can easily conclude, therefore, that our parties lack a policy of cadre development. This is to the detriment of our political life and of our country.

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

ESTABLISHMENT OF RADIO STATION BY DISY, FOREIGNERS CHARGED

Nicosia I ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 1 Nov 82 p 1

/Text/ The far rightist Democratic Rally /DISY/ plans to establish a radio station in a Cypriot sea area in cooperation with a foreign secret service known for its anti-Cypriot activities. The plans for such a radio-TV station which will broadcast anti-Cypriot and anti-government propaganda were leaked by a source in DISY's top leadership and have already drawn the attention of the security forces.

According to our exclusive reports, DISY leaders and Cypriot financiers, members of the extreme right party, had repeated contacts with cadres of the foreign service and with special technical organizations of a European country for procuring the technical equipment. Even though our information is incomplete, it should be noted that this effort for the establishment of a radio-TV station in a sea area near Cyprus is evidently part of a broader plan prepared abroad and aimed at creating conditions of destabilization in the country.

There are indications that the DISY leadership always had in mind the establishment of such a station by the extreme right. According to our recent reports certain DISY circles initiated methodical efforts towards this goal 2 months ago when the far right press was up in the air by virtue of the problems the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation /RIK/ faced as a result of the dispute between management and employees about the issues of performance and reorganization. It is pointed out that from the moment the RIK dispute surfaced and its station ceased to broadcast the sessions of the House of Representatives, the DISY press intensified its campaign against it and systematically claimed that RIK had become a tool of the government. As a matter of fact, there were times when the DISY leadership leaked the information about establishing a private radio-TV station.

7520

CSO: 3521/75

## SCHLUTER ENTERING OFFICE IN MIDST OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL ILLS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 22 Oct 82 pp 63-65

[Article by Karsten H. Hansen: "Something Is Rotten in Denmark"]

[Text] Copenhagen--A revival performance of Shakespeare's classic "Hamlet" was recently presented by the Danish National Theater at the Royal Theater. This play has not been performed in years and it was praised as a brilliant success.

The same cannot yet be said of the significant change that has taken place in the political theater of the Danish parliament (Folketinget), in which Conservative politician Poul Schluter surprisingly quickly succeeded Anker Jorgensen, who almost achieved the position of "father of the country" during his long term as prime minister.

After a rather long intermission in the manner of "Hamlet", Denmark has now received a government, the likes of which it has not had since the 1890's: a Conservative-led bourgeois-liberal government, the attitude of whose key minister is quite the same as Hamlet's repartee: "Something is rotten in the state of Denmark".

The corruption in Denmark according to Schluter is the economic quagmire, into which it is argued that the ruling Social Democrats have led the country. And Conservative prophets of doom have long predicted that Denmark is on the brink of "economic ruin". But so far it has been difficult to explain to the average citizen of Denmark's privileged welfare state what this "economic ruin" will be like. On the other hand, the people have now had the first taste of that medicine which Conservative politicians intend to prescribe in the belief that in this way the country can be kept from sliding into "economic ruin".

The change of political power occurred when the leader of the Social Democratic minority government, Anker Jorgensen, voluntarily resigned. He was unable to obtain sufficient political support for the savings- and tax increase packages in the Folketinget and on this basis decided to present his resignation to Denmark's Queen Margarethe II. In this way the formation of a new minority government from among the 10 parties in the Folketinget became the task of the chief negotiator, Poul Schluter, the leader of the Conservatives. The

result was a four-leaf clover made up of Conservatives, Liberals as well as the eight small parties, and the Christian People's Party and the Democratic Center.

Poul Schluter, a 53-year old attorney, has never been in the government before -- although he has enthusiastically aspired to this for years. Skeptics are, however, of the opinion that his appearance on the stage left empty by the Social Democrats will be short-term. "He will fall on his face," predicted Denmark's largest daily newspaper EKSTRA BLADET.

#### The Scent of Perfume

In his style and appearance Schluter is completely different than Anker Jorgensen, who received praises due to that of beloved Father of the Country on his 60th birthday last summer. When a certain important industrial leader had to describe Schluter with only one word, he chose the following: "Perfume merchant".

Immediately after assuming the duties of his office in the beginning of September Schluter began to use a more optimistic tone in the slogans directed toward the people, for example: "It must be easier to be a Dane. The bureaucracy prevailing in society must be eliminated, and the government's intent in the future is to announce every week at least two new simplification measures".

But only a very few believe that a bourgeois crisis policy can be covered up with the scent of perfume. The real essence of the text became apparent at the opening session of the Folketinget on Tuesday, 5 October. At that time the royal guests were not the only ones who listened with concern to the so-called speech from the throne.

#### Strong Economic Medicine

The new government offered strong economic policy medicine, by which an end would be brought to automatic compensation paid to the vast majority of wage earners so far and causing rapid increases in the cost of living. At the same time Denmark's nearly 300,000 unemployed will lose 10 percent of the support paid out to them.

"We are today proposing a policy which will clearly reveal the approach taken by the Liberal government toward our problems," stated Schluter in his opening speech.

"The wrong trademark," exclaimed one of Denmark's sharpest commentators, Victor Andreassen.

And it is clear that the new government, which is proposing that the state become involved in normally free wage negotiations and labor contract negotiations, is far from the traditional "liberal" policy. It is more likely that the government will be carrying out a model adapted to Social Democratic policy -- inasmuch as it wants some kind of an opportunity to push its

proposal through the Folketinget on the basis of fluctuating narrow majorities.

### Unreliable Players

Those two political player buttons, on which the government will depend in its intent to come out of all this intact, are the small Social-Liberal Party, "Radicals", and the Progressive Party led by Mogen Glistrup, a political provocateur and a tax-evasion attorney.

And these two are not at all the most reliable partners in Denmark's political game:

The Social-Liberal Party, "Radicals", is known for its political irresponsibility -- sometimes it leans to the right, sometimes to the left. On the other hand, the Progressive Party is going to have considerable difficulties in keeping together its unruly group made up of protest politicians since many of these politicians are opposed to social reductions affecting the poorer segments of the population.

And the poor will have to suffer: "How am I going to live?" asks one of the many unmarried mothers in Denmark's welfare society. No new kindergartens are being built and care for children outside of the home is becoming more expensive. The intent is quite simply to return to old bourgeois ideals -- to eliminate expensive state institutions which until now have been at the disposal of Danish citizens from childhood all the way to old age.

The fear of slipping into "economic ruin" is behind the austerity programs and the weakening of the closely knit social safety net. This fear has been conjured up by the bourgeoisie -- citing as an example the country's foreign debt, which in 7 years has risen from 12 percent of the gross national product to 28 percent and now amounts to 14 billion dollars.

### Comparison With Poland

Suddenly, Denmark has found that in the international financial papers it is being compared to Mexico and Poland with respect to suitability for credit. Several references have been made to the fact that Danish securities are perhaps no longer edged with gold inasmuch as foreign credit rating firms are reevaluating Denmark's ability to pay back its debts.

But what is the situation otherwise in a country which has suddenly become bourgeois after the voluntary resignation of the Social Democrats?

The people's opposition became immediately apparent in customary Danish fashion in the form of street demonstrations and protests. When news of the government's plans was made public, workers of the municipal sanitation department in Copenhagen drove their large trucks in front of the Folketinget located in Christiansborg in order to demonstrate their displeasure with the so-called waiting period. This waiting period means that workers must pay for the first day of sick leave themselves -- this in their opinion is a question of a gross lack of trust.



Beyond the political scene at Christiansborg, in real life, the economic disease has spread with disagreeable force in the beginning of the 1980's -- and it is taking one business firm after another into the grave.

### Scandals in Business

Bankruptcies and business failures as well as funding scandals have become a depressing daily phenomenon even among businesses with an otherwise good reputation. Denmark has not yet completely recovered from the business magnate Jan Bonde Nielsen affair. Bonde Nielsen was a big name in Denmark in the 1970's when he took control of a certain well-known industrial firm, Burmeister & Wainin, which is known throughout the whole world for its diesel motor and ship building patents. To the indignation of many Danes he sold the firm to West Germany. A special task force of the Danish police, investigating economic crimes, has attempted in vain to have Bonde Nielsen extradited from his new place of residence in London. The police estimate that he has cheated the company's stockholders and inflicted losses on them amounting to 15 million dollars.

Danish engineering and know-how continue to be the best cards if there is a desire to get out of this "economic spell" by means of exports. In the opinion of the bourgeoisie this is the direction in which the country is heading. But, for example, it is indisputably difficult to convince foreign clients of the quality of Denmark's growing construction exports since in the domestic market nearly everything has come to a stop and not one single new construction project has been started in recent years.

But it is not only a question of the economy in this crisis since a well-informed observer of Denmark's social conditions is able to perceive the following:

"We have an economic, political, ideological, and moral crisis. In a time when many feel that nothing is permanent and that values are losing their significance, we need a new picture of the future. The workers' movement had such a picture at one time. A vision of a better society. Where is it now? It is perplexing that even the leftwing has no new development model to offer. And until now the Social Democrats have placed their hopes on an economic recovery coming from outside -- while at the same time attempting to salvage the scraps of a welfare society."

"Therefore, it is imperative to create a project for the future, in which emphasis can be transferred from individual special interests to the common good," thinks Professor Peter Madsen.

But Denmark has not become "European" during its 10-year membership in the EEC and correspondingly it will also not become a bourgeois country during this new 35-day old government. To the contrary, there is a danger that it will become just as divided as the thin majority behind Conservative leader Poul Schluter in the Folketinget.



And outside in the chilly air of autumn there awaits a new generation, which is wavering between apathy and aggressive impatience. In question are 50,000 youth, who have never had work -- and who have only slim hopes of finding work. They are the untamed youth of a welfare society, and before long they will also be demanding a future for themselves -- from a Conservative prime minister.

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## FIVE ENVIRONMENT GROUPS MEET WITH RADICALS ON GREEN PARTY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 15 Nov 82 pp 1, 10

[Text] The Radical Liberal executive committee member Niels Sjoberg seems to be involved in the two recent initiatives aimed at the formation of a Danish environmental party.

About 14 days ago Sjoberg got in touch with Steffen Vedsted from the environmental group called "The Green" and called for a joint meeting in which a number of groups that are preparing for the formation of a Danish environmental party would take part, Vedsted told INFORMATION.

Sjoberg, who is vice chairman of the Radical Liberals in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, was active in preparing for the meeting and rented a room for it. But at the meeting, which took place on Saturday, there was a break between Sjoberg and the others attending the meeting. The five groups decided at the meeting to join in establishing the Green Party within the next half year.

## Name Purchased

A week ago, the weekly publication, DET NY NOTAT, issued by the People's Movement Against EC, published a letter from a reader announcing the formation of the "Environment Party," outlining a program and asking anyone who was interested to sign up.

The letter was signed by Marie Høgh. The initiator of the Environment Party is unknown to the groups now forming the Green Party, but they have tried to get in touch with Marie Høgh and have found that she has the same address as Niels Sjoberg. They have also discovered that she has purchased the rights to both names, the Environment Party and the Green Party.

Niels Sjoberg admitted to INFORMATION that he rented the premises for the meeting on Saturday. He said that he was not the one who took the initiative for the meeting but that he was contacted by Steffen Vedsted.

"I took part in the meeting because it was a debate meeting on environmental policy. I have never gone in for an environmental party at any time. I

will work to make the Radical Liberal Party Denmark's green party," said Sjoberg, who said he was satisfied with the Radical executive committee meeting. He did not wish to talk about his connection with Marianne Høgh [as published] and the Environment Party.

Sjoberg stepped out publicly before the meeting of the Radical Liberal executive committee this weekend with a sharp criticism of the way the Radical Folketing group was handling party policy.

#### Five Groups

At the meeting Saturday on the formation of an environmental party, 11 environmental groups attended. They agreed to form an "umbrella organization" that would coordinate environmental actions and other things.

At the same time five of the groups attending agreed to aim directly at the formation of a political party, the Green Party, within the next half year.

The five groups are:

The Tastrup group, which is affiliated with a municipal environmental policy ballot list in Tastrup.

The Nature High School in Mon.

Denmark's Environmental Policy Association, located in Skagen.

The "Green Group," which was established after the founders advertised for interested people in the daily press in May.

The Citizens' Justice Party.

A representative of each of these five groups will now form a coordination committee that will try to prepare the draft of a program of principle that will be discussed at a joint meeting for all the groups in December.

The spokesman for the Green Group, Steffen Vedsted, told INFORMATION that he regards the decision on the new party formation as being unconnected with the discussion in the Radical Liberal Party.

"We do not regard the Radical Liberal move on a 'green policy' as being very serious," he said. "We see it as more of a panic action, an attempt to save the pieces of a policy that there is really nothing left of."

"The other parties have had a hundred years to demonstrate that they are unable to take care of environmental interests. What is needed is a new party that is not based on an economic policy and makes a fresh start in determining how much we can 'sacrifice' on the environment."

"We believe that if one works for a sound environment and a sound ecology, a sound economy will result from it," said Steffen Vedsted.

"We are less inspired by the Danish environmental movements at the grassroots level than by the environmental parties in West Germany and Sweden. But we are hoping for good cooperation with and a lot of inspiration from the grassroots movements," said another spokesman for the Green Group, Carsten Hedemann.

The two spokesmen said the five groups that will form a party contain 300 to 400 people. Among them are several municipal council members.

They believe that Marie Høgh's purchase of the rights to the name of the Green Party can be challenged legally and they intend to do so.

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CSO: 3613/28

## PAPER SPECULATES ON HOW A GREEN PARTY WOULD AFFECT POLITICS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Nov 82 p 8

[Editorial: "The Green Wave"]

[Text] In recent years the political maps in the countries around Denmark have had a tendency to change color. In West Germany it looks greener in a number of the German states and in the upcoming federal election, Bonn may also change color. A green party has seen the light of day in Sweden. Holland has long had green environmental movements. Green is a color that has been in style recently in politics. It is only natural that it is also moving in across the Danish borders.

There is no detailed explanation of what a green position means. Green is the color of hope and the color of life and from that point of view it is a color no party would relinquish the right to bear. The Conservative Party has had green as its party color for years. The Liberals have their feet planted so solidly in Danish soil that green is a vital necessity. The Radical Liberals have decided to be green too. The Christian People's Party has tried to present a profile as the family and environment party with the emphasis on the green shades. SF [Socialist People's Party] is glad to confirm on a growing number of occasions that the red color, which at least in other contexts can act as a signal to stop, is interchangeable with green. In short, there is no lack of green viewpoints or green hopes in Danish politics.

The question is whether there is a need to assemble these views into a new party and whether such a party has any chance of existing.

The prior examples that can be studied abroad indicate that it is hard for green parties to fit into West European forms of government. In all of the countries where green parties exist the form of government is representative and parliamentary. The environmentalists may pay lip service to the parliamentary concept, even though they are unwilling to engage in parliamentary conditions, where compromises are a necessity. But they are not supporters of representative systems. They cultivate basic democracy, the direct connection with the grassroots that keeps the movement green. This makes them unusually difficult as cooperating partners.



Therefore it would also be a problem if a green party in Denmark gains so much support that it achieves representation in Folketing. For it would be a party that was strongly negative, but almost impossible to turn into an active and effective factor in Danish politics with its many compromises and constant need for new political constellations. But it would be useful for the established parties to consider the fact that although almost all of them claim to be green, it is still possible for a green wave to emerge. The explanation can be sought in the fact that not all party voter organizations function equally well. The green movements are nourished by the grass-roots. Many older parties are suffering from shortness of breath because they have neglected for too long to fertilize the soil in which their roots are growing. It is often charged that the voters are betraying the parties. But the parties should not overlook the thought that it can also be that the parties have let the voters down.

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CSO: 3613/28

## PAPER EXAMINES CHANCES FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN CABINET, SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Nov 82 p 10

[Editorial: "The Chances for Cooperation"]

[Text] The Social Democrats are pretending to be surprised that the government would like to cooperate with them. Both Anker Jorgensen and Knud Heinesen expressed their good will and added that this was something new. Apparently they have forgotten that both before and after the government was formed the prime minister advocated a cooperation with the Social Democrats across the middle of the political spectrum. And they act as if they had not even noticed the appeal for a broad cooperation that the new government has issued regularly.

It does not require any sharp political analytical talent to see the weakness involved in the majority that led to the government formation. The Progressive Party has been falling apart over the question of how far its commitment to the government extends. And the Radical Liberals are becoming more difficult every day, just so they can demonstrate that the party still exists. The Social Democratic anger over the behavior of the Radicals before the government change--an anger that has not lessened after the change--is undoubtedly analogous to feelings that extend far into the ranks of the government parties. The Radical Liberals are so unsure about their own position that they can provide no security for others.

If the Social Democrats will cooperate with the government parties, a necessary stabilization of the political balance of power will be possible. There can be no doubt that the government is interested in making use of such a possibility. In a number of situations the government is already forced to take others into consideration to a great extent and it would not be hard for its members to convince themselves that they should seek compromises with the Social Democrats in a number of areas.

But the prerequisite for being able to establish this kind of cooperative relationship is that the Social Democrats realize what is required of them. They have voluntarily relinquished government power and they must accept the fact that they cannot act as if they retained it as the opposition party. They must also realize that they cannot permit themselves to misuse their

opposition role in vital areas--such as foreign policy and defense matters--to place themselves in such a way that they undermine essential elements of the government's policy. The Social Democrats must find a form in which they can assume joint responsibility for a number of measures and achieve a degree of influence without at the same time appearing as a party which under all circumstances intends to utilize every chance to make the government a minority. The Social Democrats are not used to playing an opposition role and it is understandable that they might find it hard to achieve the proper balance. But they will have to learn how.

It is not the government parties but the Social Democrats who will determine whether a cooperation can be established and whether it will cover more and different things than those on which the parties can almost always agree.

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CP ORGAN: CENTRAL COMMITTEE ANNOUNCES CONGRESS DATE IN MAY

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 9 Nov 82 p 5

[Excerpts] The Communist Party of Denmark will hold its 27th congress in the spring of 1983.

The Central Committee decided this weekend to call the congress in the period 12-15 May 1983. At the same time it dealt with and approved the preparation of discussion background material on the political line and the draft of an action program.

The discussion material is also aimed at insuring the involvement of the party's new members in the program debate in which they were unable to take part prior to the 25th congress.

The action program will be a current summary of what communists mean by the idea of a "new policy" at the time when the congress takes place.

The party has solved a number of tasks and has stressed its position, but it has also suffered setbacks. The basis for making its efforts even better is to learn the correct lessons from the setbacks and victories and to formulate them properly.

In a critical and self-critical discussion, we will make suggestions, plan our tasks and put them into practice as a step in the democratic process in the communist party.

With reference to Paragraph 27 of the party statutes, the Central Committee announced that the party's 27th congress will be held in Brondby Strand outside Copenhagen from 12 to 15 May 1983.

At the end of 1982, LAND OG FOLK will publish background material for the congressional discussion. After New Year's, we will open up for the written discussion. In early January a report of activities will be issued as further support for district discussions prior to the congress.

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CSO: 3613/27

## CP CHAIRMAN JENSEN TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON TACTICS, UNIONS

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 9 Nov 82 p 5

[Excerpts] "We would not have had such big worker demonstrations in the showdown with the Schluter government's policy if we as a party and the individual communist out on the job site had not been involved." So said Danish CP chairman Jorgen Jensen in an evaluation at the Central Committee meeting Friday, Saturday and Sunday of the protest movements directed against the government's campaign of cuts. And what newspaper, continued Jorgen Jensen, aside from LAND OG FOLK, inspired these demonstrations? We do have the strength needed to get movements going and to influence them.

## Tasks

Jorgen Jensen reminded his audience that the demonstrations were some of the broadest-based we have seen for a long time, but that on the other hand one should not be led to believe that the Schluter government--in spite of internal difficulties--does not have the energy to carry out a class policy that can strengthen the bourgeois front for a while.

"The government has won many people over to a policy of cuts and the Social Democrats have not made things easier. In this situation it is up to communists to stand out as those who reveal the conditions and show the way."

## Danish CP and the Others

"We must carefully assess the protest movement that was set in motion and see how far the working class came. But we must also evaluate whether we used the party well enough. Did we open ourselves up both in relation to those we call the rest of the left wing and in relation to the Social Democrats?"

Jorgen Jensen referred to the pressure the left wing tried to exert on the Danish CP in that situation, among other things attacking the Danish CP for cooperating with the Social Democrats, and said:

"We will unmask the Social Democrats when they quite unreasonably cooperate on a policy that will not change things, but we also have a clear interest,



based on the interests of the workers, in cooperating with the Social Democrats to get things moving.

"Those days underlined the point that communists appear as a unifying force in union politics and that we have an audience that goes very deep within the union movement.

"This makes new demands on communists in the next few months to take up the political and union debates and to continue this struggle."

#### Unemployment

Jorgen Jensen had this to say about the conference of shop stewards in Odense on 5 December:

"The conference, which was cosponsored by communist union foremen, is not intended to replace direct actions of one kind or another or local unified actions--on the contrary. The conference should be used to emphasize the necessity of maintaining this activity. It should be used in the struggle against unemployment, to put pressure on union leaders and make employers aware that the demands from the job sites in future contract settlements must be heeded."

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## CENTER-DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP ATTACKED AT CONGRESS FOR YIELDING

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 15 Nov 82 p 3

[Text] At the party congress in Haderslev yesterday, the Center-Democratic leaders had to listen to a lot of criticism about having accepted taxation of pension fund assets.

Some of the rank-and-file delegates to the congress also felt that some ministers have expressed themselves in such a way that it gives the impression that the move will take on a permanent nature. That led Housing Minister Niels Bollmann to state clearly that the move was only a temporary one.

At the congress several prominent party people stressed that Center-Democrats should emphasize in the debate that they still oppose the pension interventions, because it is necessary for the party to maintain a political profile.

## Sold Out on Special Issues

A general theme recurring in many debate speeches indicated some dissatisfaction that CD [Center-Democrats] had been forced to enter into compromises on special issues such as the pension issue as well as on school and cultural policies.

In the context of the last issue it was stressed by party chairman Erhard Jacobsen among others that the economic situation makes it impossible to forge a new policy in these areas at this time.

## Mimi's Fiery Speech

Cultural Affairs Minister Mimi Stilling Jakobsen underlined her unofficial position as successor to the party leader with a fiery speech, with the main theme of a showdown with the attitude that leads people to "run down everything that stands out above the rest."

The cultural affairs minister said that CD must work in all areas for a policy that "provides something to strive for." Both in school and on the athletic field as well as in other aspects of community life.

Of the schools she said that children must now understand that it is all right to put up their hands. Of sports she said that it is important that we have elite sports as well as the usual sports "for all us middleaged people who need to keep in shape."

"We must have elite sports, partly because it is a pleasure to watch the performance of top sports figures and partly because it gives children who want to go into sports something to strive for," she said.

Mimi Stilling Jakobsen also denounced what she called the "We know what is best for you" attitude, saying that in her opinion it should be possible to establish a TV-2 and break the monopoly of Danish Radio.

The cultural affairs minister ended her speech, which produced a storm of applause in the hall, with a strong appeal to CD members to avoid involvement in "the stupid debate that says the unemployed are unwilling to work." She reminded her audience that there are still some people in Denmark who are in a very bad situation and that they should not be forgotten in a time when the people who can take care of themselves must have better opportunities.

#### Save on Soldiers' Pay

It came out at the congress that CD is willing to grant defense savings to the Social Democrats even though it is soldiers' pay that should be kept under control in the view of CD people.

Poul Emmert Andersen, chairman of the Folketing Defense Committee, said in this context that 180 million kroner could be saved by cutting soldiers' pay from the current 6,000-7,000 kroner to 5,000 kroner a month.

In other areas there were also references at the congress to CD overtures to the Social Democrats. The housing minister called on the Social Democrats to cooperate on housing policy, while Rene Brusvang, Folketing group chairman, wanted Social Democratic cooperation in implementing a program to promote business investments.

Brusvang also opposed expanding the treaty basis for EC cooperation, saying that he did not feel there was any public sympathy for such a move.

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CSO: 3613/27

## PAPER COMMENTS ON PROFILE, COOPERATION DEBATE AT CD CONGRESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 82 p 8

[Editorial: "The CD Congress"]

[Text] As a preliminary to the national congress of the Center-Democrats, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE presented an exchange of fire between Erhard Jacobsen and Peter Duetoft. CD [Center-Democrats] should be able to make sacrifices if that is necessary with reference to continued government cooperation, said Erhard Jacobsen. But national chairman Peter Duetoft thought that CD's period of sacrifice should be over and that the other parties in the government should now yield to CD demands and viewpoints.

The obviously divergent views had no consequences at the congress. Erhard Jacobsen was unanimously re-elected as party chairman and Peter Duetoft is still national chairman on the same terms. The exchange of opinions along with election actions provided a good picture of the scope of the new government party. Erhard Jacobsen has been in the Danish political spotlight for almost 10 years. He has been part of one big political compromise after another. He has carried Social Democratic governments, he has lent his support to a small Liberal government, he has observed an S-V [Social Democratic-Liberal] government and he was the chief architect when the foundation was laid for the present four-leaf-clover government. He has tried more things than most and--no matter how his political contribution is assessed in general--he has always been constructive and free of political prejudices.

Attitudes of this kind and with this composition are seldom found in party leaders. Many in CD have probably found it difficult from time to time to set a course and have spared a friendly thought for the party chairman on those occasions. For with the large number of parties in Folketing, the frequent elections and the many possible political constellations, it is hard to follow a parliamentary leader who wants to be constructive at almost any price.

Even so, the CD congress has confirmed once again that Erhard Jacobsen's position cannot be challenged. He is the magnet without which the party might risk losing its appeal.

Therefore, Erhard Jacobsen's line will also win out both in government co-operation and in Folketing. The congress issued invitations to the Social Democrats to participate in a more constructive political effort. The areas of housing policy and defense were indicated. And the Great Belt Bridge could also play a role again in the efforts to build bridges between the government and the opposition. But Erhard Jacobsen declared on the first day of the congress: "One thing is quite certain. This government will not collapse as a result of internal differences." Therefore there is reason to emphasize that although the congress showed signs that many members want a stronger definition of CD's special issues, Erhard Jacobsen will make sure that the definition is not stronger than the government cooperation can take. That is why he--and CD--is still such a vital component in the collective government structure.

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CSO: 3613/27



## RADICAL LIBERAL PANEL BACKS FOLKETING GROUP TACTICS

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 15 Nov 82 p 2

[Text] At a meeting that had been moved up, the Radical Liberal executive committee met Sunday in the Odense Congress Center and backed up the Radical Liberal Folketing group in connection with the economic interventions undertaken by the four-leaf-clover government.

The executive committee approved a statement acknowledging the contribution of the Folketing group. It went on to say: "As a result of the Radical efforts, conditions for those receiving unemployment and early retirement compensation, for pensioners and their housing subsidies, for families with children and daycare institutions, for theaters, culture, libraries and primary schools, were improved substantially in comparison to the government proposal."

#### Key Position

The executive committee also stressed the importance of the initiatives of the Folketing group on tax reform and mandatory profit distribution as being necessary in the total economic policy. It called for constructive talks on this between the Radicals and the government.

The Radical executive committee also called on the Folketing group to make use of what is called its "key parliamentary position" to implement "green viewpoints" in the broad sense of the term.

This refers to maintaining the agreed increase tempo for aid to developing countries, opposition to the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, military savings cuts, a stronger effort for natural and environmental protection, energy conservation and utilization of renewable energy along with reinforcement of educational and cultural policies.

It also mentioned a stronger effort for decentralization and simplification of public administration and for development opportunities for small independent units in all lines of business. A Radical policy along these guidelines is a constructive alternative to both the Conservative Party and the Social Democrats, the statement concluded.

Prior to the executive committee meeting in Odense, Radicals used the daily press and other channels to criticize a Folketing group profile that was felt to be too weak. This led among other things to a proposal that the group appoint a political spokesman and Folketing member Lone Dybkjaer was named in this connection.

This question was not directly included in the talks lasting several hours at the Odense Congress Hall. The Radical executive committee were content to leave this decision to the Folketing group, as the chairman of the group, Niels Helveg Petersen, said after the executive committee meeting.

Party chairman Thorkild Moller added that everyone accepted the way things had worked out.

#### Criticism

Helveg Petersen also remarked that the Folketing group was aware of the criticism that it had not handled things well enough. They will look into this in the near future. "We will strengthen our external activity, including our activity in relation to the press," said Niels Helveg Petersen.

The statement approved by the executive committee was prepared by Niels Helveg Petersen and Thorkild Moller, working together. A number of draft resolutions were withdrawn during the discussion.

The Radical executive committee also dealt at its meeting with a working program for the Folketing group.

6578

CSO: 3613/27

## HESSE SPD, GREENS NEGOTIATIONS LAUNCHED

West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 29 Oct 82 p 5

[Article by "broka": "Social Democrats Whose Job is Negotiation. Boerner Stays in the Background. Cooperation of Hesse Greens/ SPD"]

[Text] Late last week, Holger Boerner pulled himself out of the negotiation process with the Greens, passing the job along to the level of the party's Land legislators. Boerner, seen as a stumbling block responsible for earlier failures to reach agreements, will be replaced by two top party officials at the bargaining table: SPD Land fraction chairman Horst Winterstein and the manager of the party's Land organization and its legislative fraction, Paul Leo Giani.

## The Strategist

Paul Leo Giani, conditioned by long experience at SPD party headquarters in Bonn, came to the aid of Holger Boerner in Wiesbaden in 1976 to bring order to Hesse's SPD, then wracked by bad management and fiscal scandals. Giani, a lawyer by training, applied his muscle to the party's administration and established himself as a political strategist. Spectacular presentations before the party's membership or publicity-hounding appearances on television were not part of his style. His terrain was and still is the party's circles of insiders where he has always been able to take over the direction of things. "No one in the conservative wings of the party's leadership can hold a candle to him intellectually," is the judgement of those who know him well. Even the Juso's are stricken with cold feet when confronted with this technocrat's mastery of logic and dialectic.

Giani reached the top of his party's leadership untainted by charges of opportunism or connections, but instead by virtue of his outstanding abilities as a party functionary. He is able to make maximum use of the party's internal lines of communication and to keep its administrative machinery functioning efficiently. He saw his route laid out for him as "a test of strength that had to be undertaken even at the cost of casualties" and the possibility of a rupture in the party brought on by the controversies surrounding the new Frankfurt airport runway and the nuclear power centers WAA and Biblis C since it had to be "made clear what a party actually is-- a bloc with its own will."

The corset stays of SPD conservatism were pulled tight in as comradely and civil a way as possible: with "a lot of beer being drunk and one-on-one discussions," it was learned at first hand, Giani was able to win over the leader of the resistant SPD south precinct, Willi Goerlach, "beating into his head" the meaning of party unity through month-long spadework. His influence upon Boerner has been characterized as "maximal." Boerner's assessment to the party's legislative fraction: "Giani is the man for any job, any time."

For tactical reasons he chose not to let himself be elected to the party's Land executive council, having early perceived that this would not have been prudent in light of the touchiness of North-South and Left-Right cleavages within Hesse. While he would not have had to endure failure for lack of majorities, his capability of setting policy guidelines would have suffered. It is scarcely worth noting that the doggedness with which Giani sent the party's Right wing off into the conflict for the Frankfurt runway, WAA and Biblis makes it clear that he is definitely not to be numbered among those on the Left. Nonetheless, as a man who is basically a party functionary, he is not so easily made to fit into any ideological grid pattern. Those who know him say that achieving a majority is more important in his eyes than is any particular political line. Giani began making approaches to the Greens only after Boerner--not imprudently--had gone off "to recuperate." The party strategist then set to work--"without his agreement the other three policy draftsmen (Krollmann, Winterstein, Goerlach) would not have dared" to designate individuals for discussions with the Greens at this time.

#### The Man for Inter-Party Integration

Horst Winterstein, Hesse's SPD parliamentary floor leader, presents a far less brilliant image; he can look back at years of foot-slogging in the party's service before having been rewarded with an "office." In the Left-leaning Main-Taunus sub-precinct which was the second sub-precinct to record its disapproval of the controversial mammoth construction projects as well as the stationing of nuclear missiles, he found a job cut out for him which practically predestined him for his present function. The fact that he, a traditional though open-minded conservative, was able to hold his own in a strongly leftwing constituency, give rise to his reputation as a man capable of creating the party's capacity for integration. Constantly on the search for acceptable compromise, he was able to continue a discussion of the issue long after this local party organization had declined to support the new runway. While he accepted his defeat on the issue, he never changed his opinion.

When the leaders of the South Hesse SPD conservatives, Minister of Finance Reiz, Darmstadt's mayor, Metzger, and its most vocal member, Karl Schneider, turned their backs on the leftwing district, saying "what we can count on is our Land organization with Boerner," Winterstein was chosen as the man "to take over the deputy precinct chairmanship under Willi Goerlach." "To maintain a Left-Right balance" in the south of the Land where a Left majority prevailed, Winterstein was willing, in early 1980, to take over the job of conciliator.

He received his thanks for this undertaking the same year when he was elected leader of the SPD fraction in the Land legislature. Despite a somewhat colorless personality, his conciliatory manner succeeded in making friends within Wiesbaden's political cliques. He allowed discussion of issues--and even this small token sufficed for members who had been constantly shouted down as Leftists under the former fraction chairmanship of Karl Schneider.

Winterstein's conciliation course also served to cast oil on the waters during caucussing on volatile issues. In one instance, however, it succeeded in strengthening the position of those opposed to the government clique: the insistence on the question of nuclear waste disposal is generally attributed to Winterstein who pointed out to the minister-president that on this issue the point had been reached "where the fraction won't move one step further." Certainly without this intervention, Boerner, after the approval of the Biblis project, would have nothing with which to counter the pressures being applied by Hoffies. One lump of sugar among the many snaps of the whip.

While the fraction leader is a member of the "inner circle" of the party's leadership, he not a mover and maker of the same stripe as Giani. It is said of him that he actually wants to cooperate with the Greens, though, of course, under rules laid down by the SPD. This is a question which is not for him alone to decide, since "the Land party executive council is his unconditional guiding principle."

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CSO: 3620/88



## CP ORGAN REPORTS ON CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON CRISIS

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 27 Oct 82 p 7

[Article: "Finnish CP Minority Not Satisfied With Decisions"]

[Text] On Monday the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Central Committee's minority filed an extensive protest under the leadership of Taisto Sinisalo with respect to the decisions of the People's Democratic movement in the government question. The protest signed by 15 regular and five deputy members of the Central Committee was appended to the minutes of the proceedings of last Friday's meeting of the Central Committee.

The minority's "appeal" is a protest to the continuation of government cooperation and at the same time an indirect declaration of the minority's intent to conduct an independent parliamentary election campaign.

The point of the "appeal" is directed at the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League].

"An attempt is being made to prevent the independent political role of the SKP. An effort is being made to transfer the ideological-political and organizational leadership of our movement to the Socialist-led SKDL. As recent events have indicated, this in practice has even resulted in a subordination to the leadership of the SDP and in preparations for government cooperation with the Conservative Party," argues the "appeal".

In the opinion of the minority, Communists should resign from the government and the emphasis of all the SKP's activities should be placed "on encouraging, arranging, and leading a mass struggle".

According to the "appeal" participation in the government has resulted in the fact that "even Communists have become apologists for bourgeois policy and restrainers of mass action by the working people".

A number of immediate and longer-term demands adopted, for the most part, unanimously by the SKP are enumerated in the "appeal". The minority urges the party sections to take action for getting the party out of the government and proposes that the sections make members of the party leadership "answer for their deeds" and warns against "allowing anyone to walk over you". All

of this is necessary according to the "appeal" so that "trust in the SKP, party unity, and its a ability to function can be restored".

#### Reference to Elections

At the conclusion of the "appeal" the minority issued a reminder of the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

"In order to guarantee success in the elections, all forces must be united on behalf of the SKP, a turn to the left must be accomplished in our party's practical policy, and the SKP's own faces differing from all the other parties must be brought to the forefront."

Those signing the "appeal" are Central Committee members Taisto Sinisalo, Arvo Vihtori Aalto, Veikko Alho, Heikki Anttila, Kirsti Honkasalo, Aarno Nieminen, Ilmari Nieminen, Jarmo Nieminen, Heikki Pusa, Benjamin Reittu, Kalevi Rissanen, Ensio Saano, Marjatta Stenius, and Seppo Toiviainen as well as deputy members Marko Auer, Airi Kyntomaa, Mirja Ruikka, Kaija Sinerva, and Olli Vainola.

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CS0: 3617/25

## KIVISTO DISCUSSES ROLE IN DEVALUATION CRISIS, LEFT UNITY

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 22 Oct 82 pp 14-15

[Article by Antti Blafield: "Kalevi Kivisto Fears Appearance of SMPDL in Finland"]

[Text] It has been said that Kalevi Kivisto has just as much charisma as a pointer stick. However, the licentiate in pedagogy also knows how to use the pointer stick for its original purpose: to strike undisciplined pupils on their fingers.

Chairman Kalevi Kivisto of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] is the little Dutch boy with his finger in the hole of the dike in Finnish consensus politics, whose task is to prevent the dike from collapsing. Consensus politics means all the political factions are brought together behind important decisions.

When Kalevi Sorsa and Kalevi Kivisto agreed on a model, by which the People's Democrats could remain in the government, during a recess at the government's evening school at 5:00 pm on Wednesday, 13 October, they also agreed on additional time for consensus politics.

For Kalevi Kivisto this common-cause politics is an ideal situation as well as power politics. As long as the SKDL remains in the government, the position of power for the Socialists in the SKDL will be maintained. Indeed, the price paid for this is the continuing decline in support for the Communists, but this, on the other hand, is Jouko Kajanoja's concern.

The Socialists have acquired a special position during this period of left-wing cooperation since they have acted as mediators between the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. Obstacles of prestige between the two large leftwing parties considered to be insurmountable have been overcome before with the aid of Kivisto.

Kivisto's special position is further strengthened by his special relationship with Mauno Koivisto. This relationship came about during Koivisto's government when these two Socialists enchanted with political realism took care of matters while circumventing the decisionmaking organs of their parties.

When Sorsa's government was put together after the presidential elections, Kivisto consented to continue as a minister only after being persuaded by Koivisto.

If the SKDL is forced into opposition, the consequence will be a strengthening of the Communists' position within the movement and a strengthening of the position of the minority Communists within the SKP. The consequence would thus be a new division of political positions, in which the Socialists led by Kivisto would be left holding cards that nobody wants. When Kivisto talks about the background of his actions, the basis of this political realism must be taken into consideration.

#### Price

"The price to be paid for opposing the economic package decided upon in connection with the devaluation must not be the termination of government cooperation. The SKDL's opposing view is already known, it is now a question of whether we want to demonstrate this view in several stages at the expense of government cooperation.

"What would have been the alternative? It would have been a permanent change in the composition of government cooperation and in the political composition in general. Most likely, the SKDL would have been forced into a long-term period of opposition and would have become a kind of SMPDL [possibly Finnish Rural Party Democratic League]. This in my opinion is a rather poor prospect for the future."

Kalevi Kivisto came to this conclusion on Monday morning in Bulgaria already when he received news of the government crisis. From Bulgaria he continued his trip to the GDR and telephoned Sorsa immediately upon his arrival at the airport in Berlin. "For my own part, I attempted to make the assurance that negotiations were still worth-while.

"The SKDL's Socialists are perhaps the most reliable supporters of workers' cooperation in the whole leftwing. Naturally, a period of cooperation is that which is in certain respects a most favorable period for the Socialists.

"Those politicians for whom changing the SKDL into an SMPDL would be a favorable situation are of a different stripe."

#### Fruit

The fruit of leftwing cooperation has been a stable economic and social development for Finland in comparison with other Western countries. We have been able to continue a social reform policy, and economic development, on the whole, has been considerably better than the average.

"To me it is paradoxical if the SKDL must pay the price for the fact that social and economic development in Finland is more positive than in other Western countries."

However, faith in the correctness of politics is not very strong even in Kivisto's own camp and it is even weaker among the majority Communists, who will have to explain in the forthcoming elections the support received by industry at the same time that the SKP's minority was hitting its head against the wall.

Kivisto emphasized in the SKDL's Joint Government and Joint Council that his intent is not to change the SKDL's position opposing the devaluation package. However, abstention in parliament is the same as remaining silent and, as is well known, a sign of affirmation.

Definite approval can even be heard in Kivisto's speeches when he evaluated the devaluation package. "This solution is not completely orthodox, but it is not completely heretical either.

"The solution primarily means that the use of the labor force will not be burdened by funding a social policy. An orthodox solution would be that reductions would be made in the burdens placed on the use of the labor force and this burden would then be made commensurate with the value of production when capital-intensive enterprises would be more reasonably included in this burden and labor-intensive enterprises would carry a lighter burden.

"Increasing the sales tax means this in a certain way, but only in the second stage of the marketing round. This kind of a burden placed on the production phase or on the marketing phase will then always cause a certain amount of price pressure. And even though the price pressure increases in proportion to the increase in the sales tax, it is reduced by the reduction in social security payments paid by employers. This restraint on cost pressures must be taken into consideration by commerce and industry as a cost factor and over a longer period of time it will have an impact.

"In my opinion credibility in the eyes of the people will come about when the SKDL wants to be included in the building of this society in a responsible manner and not through tactics."

Because of the special position of Kalevi Kivisto and the Socialists, the center--leftwing government is in a much stronger position in Finland than elsewhere. The result is an economic policy which the Conservative Party cannot help but support. The consequence of this may be that the political center and the Social Democrats will become stronger over the long term.

But if the Socialists are not able to guide the SKDL in a direction of a co-operative policy, the consequence may be to the contrary. The sides become higher and the center becomes weaker. The SKDL's Socialists are already a part of the center.

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## STALINIST ORGAN HITS STENBACK'S HANDLING OF POLISH ISSUE

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 26 Oct 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Changes?"]

[Text] In Finland a kind of foreign policy storm has arisen over Foreign Minister Stenback's statement or rather concurrence with the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany on the matter of bringing up the Polish issue at the CSCE meeting in Madrid, for which the whole reactionary world is making preparations up to and including a general strike declared by Solidarity.

The President of the Republic has also become involved in this issue and has confirmed that there was nothing out of the ordinary in the statement by Finland's foreign minister. Also according to Koivisto's assumption the Polish issue may become the subject of discussion in Madrid.

It is clear that any issue whatever may be brought up in Madrid. For example, the Finnish issue. The Finnish issue, for its part, would be such that in the constitution it states unemployment will be prevented -- after a known addition the declaration is unconditional -- but Finland does not observe this and tramples on people's basic rights by allowing, and even promoting by government measures, the increase in unemployment to unprecedented levels.

No one has ever calculated the amount of suffering this brings to the people, but this is a definite and gross violation of human rights. So gross that it should of necessity be discussed in Madrid.

But Finland's foreign minister does not anticipate that this issue will be brought up in Madrid. On the contrary, he expects that the situation in Poland will be brought up even though there are relatively far fewer strikes in Poland than in Finland and there is nothing humane to say about the struggle Finland's officials are waging against strikes.

Anyone who knows anything about the international situation comprehends that even though it has only been stated that the Polish issue may possibly be brought up in Madrid, it is already beyond dispute that a stand has been taken on behalf of bringing up this issue. The more often this "neutral" stand is presented, the more certain it is that support will be given to positions opposing Poland and to interference in Poland's internal affairs. Are changes, in fact, taking place in Finland's foreign policy? This question is being asked with greater reason than ever before.

## SORSA DISCUSSES CHANCES OF CONSERVATIVES FOR CABINET ROLE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Oct 82 p 3

[Article: "Sorsa Considers Government Base"]

[Excerpt] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat) considers that there is "much that is good and lasting" in the present leftwing and center government base. However, the prime minister wants a deliberation of common goals and an establishment of objectives over a longer period of time than at present.

Prime Minister Sorsa has given an interview in the 65th anniversary issue of LALLI, the Center Party's paper published in Kokemaki. In Sorsa's opinion cooperation of the left and center is also in need of "additional broad-mindedness, courage, and creative force in the spirit of straightforward trust".

Sorsa considered that the era of great struggles between the Social Democrats and the Center Party is over in Finland. There will be conflicts of interest in the future, but according to Sorsa they will be resolved in a more reasonable manner.

To the question concerning the entry of the Conservative Party into the government the prime minister answers that "the Conservative Party will be going into the elections from the same starting line as the other parties".

"I feel somewhat averse toward discussing the Conservative Party's 'entry' into the government. The Conservative Party seems to be attempting a referendum in the elections on whether it should be 'taken' into the government. Indeed, I would think that other parties are needed in the government," states Sorsa.

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## POLL SHOWS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVES IN GOVERNMENT

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 24 Oct 82 p 5

[Article by Seija-Riitta Laakso: "One in Two Rejects People's Front, Conservatives Wanted in Government"]

[Text] One out of two Finnish citizens would like to change the government base so that the Conservative Party would also be included in the government instead of the present center--leftwing cooperation. Only one in three would like to retain the present people's front base. Seventeen percent of the people has no opinion on the government question.

These figures are from an UUSU SUOMI opinion poll conducted by Taloustutkimus Oy. [Economic Research Company]. In light of these figures it seems quite clear that the forthcoming parliamentary elections will, indeed, become government elections, as has been predicted from various quarters.

The inclusion of the Conservative Party in the government is supported by 52 percent of the male voters and 46 percent of the female voters. One-fifth of the women is not able to form an opinion on this question. A full 24 percent of youth between the ages of 18 and 24 does not have an opinion on this issue.

The Conservative Party should be included in the government next spring according to 55 percent of the farmers, 36 percent of the blue-collar workers, and 65 percent of the intellectual workers. The present government base is supported by 29 percent of the farmers, 45 of percent of the blue-collar workers, and 23 of the intellectual workers.

There are more people in urban areas who would change the government base than in rural areas and small communities. Also in the latter category there are more people who have not yet formed an opinion.

## Only Leftwing Would Continue Cooperation

It is natural that the leftwing parties are for the present government base. Preference for the continuation of present cooperation is given by 54 percent of the Social Democrats and 73 percent of the People's Democrats. However, one in three Social Democrats would also include the Conservative Party in the government, 14 percent has no opinion.

The leadership of the Center Party should have reason to consider the results of the poll, which show that 52 percent of Center Party members as well as 62 percent of the supporters of the small parties -- the Liberals and the RKP [Swedish People's Party], among others -- would want a more bourgeois form of government.

Only one in three members of the Center Party and one in five supporters of the splinter parties hopes for a continuation of the present government base.

After this there is hardly any doubt about the Conservatives' own government aspirations. Among its supporters 92 percent would be happy to see Conservative ministers on tv news making statements on important issues. Only 3 percent is satisfied with the present government.

A total of 1,003 people was interviewed in the poll between 20 September and 13 October. The interviews were conducted in 73 different localities and they are part of the so-called Omnibus poll, which is conducted twice monthly. The research material is weighted against Finland's official statistics.

A new government will be appointed after the parliamentary elections. We have had a government base made up of the left and the center for a long time. Which of the following alternatives should be taken as a premise for forming the next government, the present government base of the left and the center or a government in which the Conservative Party would also be included?

	All	SDP	SKDL	KOK	KESK	Others
Present						
government base	34	54	73	3	32	20
Conservatives						
included	49	32	15	92	52	62
No opinion	17	14	12	5	15	18

Key:

SDP = Social Democratic Party  
SKDL = Finnish People's Democratic League  
KOK = Conservative Party  
KESK = Center Party

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CSO: 3617/25

## FINLAND AFTER KEKKONEN, A QUESTION OF CONTINUITY OR CHANGE

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT in German 18 Sep 82 Supplement pp 21-30

[Article by Wolfgang Hirn: "Finland After Kekkonen--Continuity or Change"]

[Text] I. Introduction

On 26 October 1981 the 81-year-old Finnish head of state, Urho Kekkonen, declared that for reasons of health he was unable to carry on with his government responsibilities. This resignation by Kekkonen, who had headed Finland since 1956, concluded a political era in that Scandinavian country. Some observers have compared Finland after Kekkonen to Yugoslavia after Tito or France after de Gaulle.<sup>1</sup> And here and there in the discussion aimed at elucidating the turning point in Finnish policy during the transition from Kekkonen to his successor, Mauno Koivisto, one could hear mention of a "third republic"<sup>2</sup> in allusion to the French numbering of republics.

II. The Election Campaign

Immediately after Kekkonen had announced that he could not carry on with his duties, the Finnish government decided to conduct new elections in January 1982. On 17 and 18 January, for a start, the 301 electors were to be elected, and they in turn would have to elect the president on 26 January.

1. The Nomination of Candidates

The succession struggles in the parties over a presidential candidate had begun even before Kekkonen's official announcement of resignation. Particularly in the Center Party (Keskustapuolue) and the Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue/SKP) there erupted violent arguments concerning their candidates.<sup>3</sup> Whereas the reformist Communist majority wing of the SKP wanted to nominate a candidate of its own, the Stalinist wing came out for Center politician and head of the Central Bank Ahti Karjalainen. The latter, however, was controversial in the Center Party itself. While he was favored by the party leadership and the Center Party deputies in the Diet, party members as a whole were more in favor of Diet Speaker Johannes Virolainen.



This argument in the Center Party was complicated by the one-sided stand taken by the party organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) PRAVDA immediately before the decisive nomination congress in Kuopio on 22 November 1981. Without mentioning any names, PRAVDA clearly came out for Karjalainen, whereas Virolainen was taken to task for his part as foreign minister in the so-called "night frost government."<sup>4</sup> Moscow's interference turned out to be counterproductive, however. At the congress 2,666 delegates came out for Virolainen, and only 1,365 for Karjalainen.

When shortly thereafter the Finnish Christian League nominated Rauno Westerholm as its candidate, there were eight candidates: Mauno Koivisto of the Socialist Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue/SPD), the prime minister and acting president; Harri Holkeri of the conservative National Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus/KOK); Jan-Magnus Jansson of the Swedish People's Party (Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue/RKP); Helvi Sipilä, the only woman, of the Liberal People's Party (Liberalinen kansanpuolue/LKP); Rauno Westerholm of the Christian League (Suomen Kristillinen Liitto/SKL), Veikko Vennamo of the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue); and Kalevi Kivisto of the Finnish People's Democratic League (Suomen kansan demokraattinen Liitto/SKDL), an umbrella organization of communists and leftwing socialists. Thus all significant parties in the Finnish party system were represented with candidates of their own.

## 2. The Election Campaign

Despite the fact that the approximately 3.9 million Finnish voters thus for the first time since 1965 were offered a "genuine" choice between several candidates, the election campaign could be described as rather dull.<sup>5</sup> There was a lack of controversial issues. In foreign policy all eight candidates more or less unequivocally supported the so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. In domestic politics the bourgeois parties--primarily the Center Party and the conservative party--warned against a Mitterrand effect which might occur as a result of the possible election of Social Democratic candidate Koivisto. The two big bourgeois parties were out to give Koivisto a socialist image. Koivisto sought to guard against these attacks by waging a consciously reserved and nonideological election campaign. He presented himself to the voters as a "man of the people" (one of his election slogans), and the people apparently were impressed with this garb of Koivisto's. In the last Gallup poll before the election of the electors, 56 percent were for Koivisto and only 11 percent each for Center politician Virolainen and conservative Holkeri. This last poll also made it clear, however, that there was an obvious gap between the preference for the candidates and the preference for the parties. Thus only 37 percent of those polled were prepared to vote for a Social Democratic elector. In other words, Koivisto was far more popular than the party to which he belonged. Conversely the support for Virolainen and Holkeri was clearly less than that for the electors of their parties. Of those polled, 17 percent said they planned to vote for electors of the conservatives, and only 16 percent said they planned to vote for those of the Center Party.

A comparison with the opinion poll before Christmas shows that Koivisto, whom 54 percent had favored as president at that time, had managed to increase his popularity. At the same time the inclination to vote for a Social Democratic elector had decreased, however. The closer the time of the election, the greater was the readiness of voters to remember their party preferences. Thus no observer figured that Koivisto would get the 151 Social Democratic electors required for an absolute majority.

### 3. The Election

The election of the 301 electors on 17 and 18 January 1982, contrary to all expectations, resulted in a great victory for Mauno Koivisto and the Social Democrats, who won 145 electors or 43.3 percent of the vote.

The election results:

	<u>Electors</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>1979 Diet election</u>
Social Democrats	145	43.3	23.9
Conservatives	58	18.7	21.7
Center	53	16.9	17.3
People's Democrats	32	11.0	17.9
Swedish People's Party	11	3.8	4.2
Rural Party	1	2.3	4.6
Liberals	1	1.8	3.7

In view of this result the election of Koivisto in the first round was a foregone conclusion. The sole elector of the Rural Party, Veikko Vennamo, had stated previously that he would vote for Koivisto. The Communists once more revealed their split, with the 21 electors considered to represent the majority of Communists wanting to vote for Koivisto and the 11 Stalinist minority Communists deciding in favor of People's Democrat Koivisto. In the 1st round, on Koivisto was elected to be the 9th Finish president by the votes of the 145 Social Democratic electors, the 21 majority Communists and Vennamo. Thus for the first time a Social Democrat now was head of the Finnish state.

### III. Continuity in Foreign Policy

When he took office on 27 January 1982, Koivisto--as he had done in the election campaign--emphasized anew that he would "continue to pursue without restriction"<sup>6</sup> the foreign policy course of his two predecessors, Paasikivi and Kekkonen. He said it was his most important task to work for a constant

strengthening of the good-neighborly relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union on the basis of the mutual assistance treaty.<sup>7</sup> In second place of his foreign policy list of priorities, Koivisto named the effort for developing further the cooperation with the other Nordic countries.

Koivisto's first trips abroad underlined this unchanged emphasis of Finnish foreign policy. On his first trip abroad, Koivisto visited Moscow 9 to 11 March. This trip was described as a "working visit," while the first official state visit, 27-29 April, in accordance with tradition, saw him to the Scandinavian neighboring country, Sweden.

For a long time, Moscow's attitude toward Koivisto was an indifferent one. Though Koivisto had been prime minister since 1979, he had never been officially invited to visit the Soviet Union. Only right before the election of electors, Soviet state and party head Brezhnev, in reply to a message congratulating him on his 75th birthday, took a stand on Koivisto attesting to him "with a feeling of satisfaction" that he had supported the Finnish effort and readiness actively to continue to contribute to the relations based on the treaty of cooperation and assistance of 1948.<sup>8</sup>

During Koivisto's first visit to Moscow both sides evidently were bent on underlining the continuity in Finnish-Soviet relations. Brezhnev praised Finland as a "good and loyal partner"<sup>9</sup> and described Koivisto's visit as a continuation of the useful and fruitful tradition of strengthening the mutual relations through personal contacts between the leaders of the two countries.<sup>10</sup> Koivisto once more, in the Kremlin, gave assurances of his fidelity to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, saying: "In my 6-year term of office Finland will doubtless continue on the road pointed out by my two predecessors, Paasikivi and Kekkonen."<sup>11</sup> However, in addition to this affirmation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, Koivisto made apparent certain shifts in emphasis in the Finnish foreign policy line. One cannot help gaining this impression for two reasons. For one thing, Koivisto made it a point to stress the things the Nordic countries had in common by raising relations with the Nordic countries to the same level as that of Finnish-Soviet relations; for another thing, one was struck by the guarded assessment of the Kekkonen plan concerning a nuclear-weapons-free zone in northern Europe. These passages in Koivisto's Moscow address in the time to come led to certain irritations concerning the line of Finnish foreign policy, with the result that Koivisto found himself compelled on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Finnish Deit to expound his foreign policy clearly once again.<sup>12</sup> In that speech he rejected suppositions of his aiming at closer cooperation with the Scandinavian countries at the expense of relations with the Soviet Union just as firmly as the opinion that he was advocating the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in northern Europe with less resolve than Kekkonen had done. In that address Koivisto once again "quite emphatically" endorsed Kekkonen's foreign policy.

#### 1. Fundamental lines of Finnish Foreign Policy

Postwar Finnish foreign policy had received its stamp from the two presidents, Juho Kusti Paasikivi (1946-1956) and Urho Kekkonen (1956-1982). The fact

it was the presidents who shaped Finnish foreign policy, aside from the outstanding personalities of these two statesmen, is based on the Finnish constitution, which assigns to the president the responsibility of determining foreign policy. Postwar Finnish foreign policy may be described as an expanding foreign policy, in the sense that "the geographic framework of our foreign policy is expanding."<sup>13</sup> Under Paasikivi it was primarily a question of settling the relations with the Soviet Union. Though the membership in the United Nations (1955) still fell into Paasikivi's term, the opening toward the West and the active role as a neutral country did not occur until Kekkonen's term. In the opinion of political scientist Jansson, each new step of this expanding Finnish foreign policy derives from the previous one: "Finland would have been unable either to take the stance of a neutral country or to make other countries appreciate its efforts if it had not previously placed its relations with the Soviet Union of a firm foundation. And Finland would not have been able to perform on the international state--particularly as host of the CSCE--without previously having received recognition of its neutrality."<sup>14</sup>

## 2. Finnish-Soviet Relations

For every country its frontiers are an important factor determining its foreign-policy decisionmaking process. In Finland's case its geopolitical situation--a border with the the superpower of the Soviet Union about 1,265 kilometers long--in fact is the crucial determining factor. Apart from geography, history became the second most important determinant of Finnish foreign policy after World War II. World War II taught the Finns that the chain of war confrontations between little Finland and overpowering Russia had to come to an end.

After the Soviet-Finnish armistice of 19 September 1944<sup>15</sup> in which Finland had to cede 12 percent of its territory to the Soviet Union, lease the base of Porkkala to the Soviets and pay about 300 million dollars' worth of reparations, Finnish politicians made the first timid attempts to rethink and give new shape to the relationship with the Soviet Union.

The first to come out with it clearly was Urho Kekkonen in a radio address on 25 September 1944, when he said: "The superior power of the Soviet Union is absolute and fundamental. To recognize this and to act accordingly in the future is an indispensable prerequisite of our national existence."<sup>16</sup> But it was only later that these thoughts of young Kekkonen found a place in official policy, when President Paasikivi declared on 6 December 1946 in his address on Finnish Independence Day: "Personally I am convinced that it is of basic importance for the continuing welfare of our nations for Finnish policy to be shaped in such a way in the future as to never run counter to the interests of the Soviet Union."<sup>17</sup> This address by Paasikivi may be termed the point of departure of the so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

This new Finnish foreign policy coincided with the security policy interests of the Soviet Union, which was interested primarily in Finland not waging a war of aggression against it. In the Treaty Concerning Friendship,



Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the Finnish Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (FCA treaty)<sup>18</sup> of 6 April 1948 this desire of Moscow's was codified. In article 1 of this treaty Finland pledges "in the event that Finland or the Soviet Union across Finnish territory becomes the object of an armed attack by Germany or another country allied with it, ... to fight, in accordance with its obligations as an independent country, to war off this attack."<sup>19</sup> This defense can "if need be take place with the support of Soviet Union or together with it."

In other words, Finland in this treaty obligates itself to the Soviet Union to defend its borders. Paasikivi interpreted this immediately after the signing of the treaty in a radio address as follows: "All that, in my opinion, goes without saying and derives from the nature of things."<sup>20</sup> Kekkonen too later referred to the fact that this goes without saying, stating: "Finland pledged to defend its territorial integrity within its own borders, which of course it would do anyway, even if there were no treaty."<sup>21</sup>

In the event that the Soviet Union was attacked in a direction other than across Finnish territory, Finland is not obliged in any way to assist it. That is the crucial difference from the FCA treaties which the Soviet Union concluded immediately before the Finnish-Soviet FCA treaty with Romania and Hungary. Though Stalin mentioned those two treaties as models when he proposed to Finnish President Paasikivi on 22 February 1948 to enter into negotiations, the Finnish delegation in the succeeding negotiations to a large extent managed to prevail with its stand.

Article 2 of the treaty provides for obligatory consultation in the event "that a threat of the kind of military attack referred to in article 1 has been established."

So far the Soviet Union has once demanded the kind of consultations provided for in article 1. That was late in 1961 in the so-called note crisis,<sup>22</sup> when the Berlin crisis was approaching its climax and German-Danish talks had begun about the planned establishment of a new NATO command for the points of access to the Baltic. After a meeting between Khrushchev and Kekkonen in late November 1961 in Novosibirsk, the Soviets, however, withdrew their request for consultations. This not crisis has been the most serious liability for postwar Finnish-Soviet relations so far. But since that time the relations between these two countries have normalized further. The FCA treaty was extended twice and is now valid until 1990.

Under the roof of the FCA treaty a thick batch of bilateral treaties has developed, particularly in the economic sphere. In Finnish-Soviet trade there are three levels of treaties differing in duration and degree of concreteness. At the highest level there is the long-term program of cooperation in trade and industry signed in 1977 and valid until 1990.<sup>23</sup> It provides for rates of growth in goods exchange as a whole and in individual branches of industry. In the two 3-year periods of 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 the exchange of goods between Finland and the Soviet Union is to increase by 30 percent each. Concerning these 5-year periods,



agreements about goods exchange have existed since as far back as 1950. The quotas for particular categories of goods set roughly in these agreements are then specified exactly in annual goods exchange protocols. For example: The 1981-1985 5-year treaty provides for the export of 11,500 to 15,000 Soviet passenger cars in 1982, and the goods exchange protocol for 1982 fixed the export figure as only 11,200.

Finnish-Soviet trade developed from the reparation payments which Finland had to pay to its eastern neighbor after World War II. Though the reparation payments were a heavy burden on the country at the time, Kekkonen had some good things to say about them ex post facto: "The reparation payments forced us to develop sectors which previously had received very little attention in our economic life. If one looks at the significance of the reparations from this point of view, one can see that the constraint emanating from them diversified the ability of our industry to produce, creating better prerequisites for a lasting rise of our economic life compared with the past."<sup>24</sup>

Not least as a result of these very reparation payments and their consequences, in the postwar years the share of Finnish-Soviet trade in Finnish trade as a whole rose to not quite 18 percent, before dropping to 12 percent by 1973. But after the first huge rise in the price of crude oil late in 1973, trade with the Soviet Union increased substantially. In 1981 Finnish-Soviet trade reached new records:

The share of Soviet goods in Finnish imports amounted to 23.5 percent, and the Soviet share in exports increased to as much as 24.7 percent.

The increase in goods going back and forth between Finland and the Soviet Union in the past few years is due to the structure of this bilateral trade. About 80 percent of imports from the USSR consist of energy. The accounting basis in the Finnish-Soviet goods exchange is world market prices, and as a result the higher oil prices have caused a rise in the value of imports from the Soviet Union. Since Finnish-Soviet trade proceeds by way of barter and in addition must always be balanced, the Finns were obliged to increase their exports to the Soviet Union has been a boon for the Finnish economy in the past few years because it enabled it to offset the fall in demand from the Western markets caused by the recession. "Not least owing to the exports to the USSR, Finland was able to attain the biggest economic growth among Western industrialized countries in 1979 and 1980."<sup>25</sup>

### 3. Relations With Scandinavia

"In addition to the relations of trust between Finland and the Soviet Union, the other cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy is close Nordic cooperation."<sup>26</sup>

This Nordic cooperation between Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland was institutionalized by the founding of the Nordic Council in 1952. The Nordic Council is a consultative organ composed of parliamentarians and members of government of these five countries. Finland did not become

a member of the Nordic Council until 1955. President Paasikivi having taken an attitude of reserve toward membership out of consideration for the Soviet Union, Kekkonen, prime minister at the time, paved the way for Finnish membership during his visit to Moscow in September 1955.<sup>27</sup>

The agenda of the Nordic Council includes economic, social, educational and transport questions. The foreign ministers meetings, held twice a year, primarily deal with the coordination of points of view at the United Nations and other international organizations. Questions of security policy are excluded. As far as security policy is concerned the Scandinavian countries do not form a homogenous group. While Denmark, Norway and Iceland are members of NATO, Sweden and Finland are neutral countries. But precisely the maintenance of this military Scandinavian balance is of crucial importance for Finland. "What is important is...to maintain the key stabilizing elements in the north European situation--for example, the traditional Swedish policy of neutrality and the somewhat limited military cooperation between Denmark and Norway, on the one hand, and their big-power allies, on the other."<sup>28</sup>

Against this background must also be seen Kekkonen's plan for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in northern Europe with the aim of codifying the de facto nuclear-weapons-free situation in northern Europe.<sup>29</sup>

Within the almost problem-free relations with the Nordic countries, Finnish cooperation with Sweden enjoys a special status. It is based primarily on a common history. Until 1809 Finland was part of the Swedish Kingdom. Today the Finns are primarily interested in a continuation of the Swedish policy of neutrality, for it supports their own course of neutrality. Thus a report by a parliamentary defense committee appointed by the Finnish government states: "It should be noted particularly that the traditional freedom from alliances on the part of Sweden is a positive factor as far as Finland is concerned. Finland's policy of neutrality is supported by the strong and manifold Swedish defense. In the event of an armed conflict, the Swedish defense capacity also helps to prevent a military threat to Finnish territory."<sup>30</sup>

#### 4. Finland's Active Policy of Neutrality

Already in the preamble of the FCA treaty there is recorded "the Finnish effort to remain outside the conflicts of interests of the big power." While there is not explicit mention there of "neutrality" and preambles are not contractually binding in international law,<sup>31</sup> Finland's status as a neutral country has been generally recognized in the meantime.

Finland's route to this recognition proceeded in several stages. In the postwar years the Finns' neutral image was blemished by the fact that the Soviet Union, with Porkkala, still had a military base on Finnish territory. Not before the departure of the Soviets in September 1955 was "the way open to international recognition of Finnish neutrality."<sup>32</sup> A short time thereafter, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Finland for the first time was referred to as a neutral country in an official announcement of the Soviet

Union. On his journeys to the Western countries of the United States, Great Britain and France in the early 1960's Kekkonen was then in a position to note "that all big powers had explicitly recognized Finnish neutrality."<sup>33</sup>

Following this de facto recognition of its neutrality, Finland in the years thereafter—favored by the rising detente between East and West—began to pursue an active policy of neutrality. The main reason for these activities: "For Finland it is particularly important that its foreign policy is known and well understood, that it enjoys the confidence of other countries. Therefore Finland was very pleased to assume certain international tasks for which neutral countries are especially suited or even needed."<sup>34</sup>

In 1968 Finland decided to seek membership in the UN Security Council. "Thus Finland for the first time dared tread the ground of top-level international politics."<sup>35</sup> As early as 1969 Finland offered to host the Soviet-U.S. talks for limiting strategic nuclear weapons (SALT), and the SALT rounds in 1968 and 1970 in fact took place in Helsinki. Differently from the SALT talks, at which Finland played a passive role, having merely offered a neutral ground for the talks of the two superpowers, Finland showed itself far more active at another big event. With a memorandum to the governments of the European nations, the United States and Canada in May 1969<sup>36</sup> it participated in a crucial way in initiating the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and at the same time offered to host the conference. The fact that the CSCE took place in Helsinki in 1973 and 1975 may be evaluated as a great prestige success and at the same time as clear confirmation of the Finnish policy of neutrality.

Another important sphere of activity of Finland's active policy of neutrality is the United Nations. Within the UN framework, Finland time and again furnished soldiers for the UN peace forces and moreover played an important mediating role in the North-South dialogue and the disarmament negotiations. In Kekkonen's view Finland's role in the United Nations is that "of a physician rather than a judge. We have stayed away from putting forth complaints and pointing up judgements, attempting instead to find possibilities of solutions of problems by putting ourselves in the shoes of those facing them."<sup>37</sup>

#### IV. Changes in Finland's Political System

##### 1. The Decisionmaking Structure in Finland

Finland's political system may be characterized "as a republican parliamentary democracy in which the power and importance of the head of state is also in reality so great as to lend the system a stamp of its own."<sup>38</sup> This rather presidential system of government may be compared to the French Fifth Republic, but, in contrast with France, in Finland the president is elected not direct by the people but by electors. To this extent the Finnish president has only an indirect democratic legitimacy.

The Finnish constitution, which has been in force continuously since 1919, assigns a strong position to the president. This dominance of the head of

state is traditional in Finnish constitutional history. According to the constitution, the president has the right to propose laws and to issue decrees. Besides he can delay the passing of laws adopted by the Diet through a suspensive veto or even prevent their taking effect. Finally he can call special sessions of the Diet, call new elections and dissolve the Diet. The president's foreign policy responsibility is fixed by article 33, which states that "the president determines relations with foreign nations."

"But perhaps rather than by quoting the articles, the outstanding importance of the head of state can be explained through some traditional and personal circumstances and through prerequisites created by political situation."<sup>39</sup> These circumstances, for a start, include the fact that most Finnish presidents have been persons of great personality. Particularly after World War II the position of the president was strengthened further because both Paasikivi and Kekkonen were considered guardians of foreign policy continuity.

The position of the president also became so strong because most Finnish governments had only a weak parliamentary base. As a result of the splintered party system it has generally been difficult to form a government with a majority. There have often been minority governments and during especially long term government crises so-called governments of officials or experts had to be resorted to. This fragility of governments of course strengthened the position of the president as the most important guarantee of continuity in Finnish policy. Thus, while the position of the president became increasingly strong, "the significance of the Diet as the primary state power receded."<sup>40</sup> One may wonder whether Koivisto can, or in fact wants to, stop this trend.

Already at his inauguration Koivisto gave assurances that he would make his decisions in close coordination with the government and parliament. He said it would be his guiding principle in domestic politics to make relations between the democratic institutions of the country open and honest ones and oriented toward cooperation.<sup>41</sup> In nominating a new government he asked it to be more active in foreign policy.

He said that increased activity by the foreign policy committee of the government would also be welcome. Yet Koivisto recalled the fact that in accordance with the constitution it was the president's privilege to conduct foreign policy. In domestic affairs, he did not want to arrogate this leadership role to himself, saying that "the president should not be the leader in domestic politics."<sup>42</sup> In the meantime a discussion has been going on in Finland about the pros and cons of the presidential position of power. Constitutional amendments curtailing the power of the president are not being ruled out. Furthermore a debate is going on about whether the president should be elected by the people direct and whether his time in office should be limited to two terms (12 years in all).

The first months of Koivisto's presidency have shown that the domestic political climate in Finland has changed. Things that used to be taboo--including the president's abundance of power--are being discussed openly.



In fact Koivisto himself is participating in the debate. He says and also shows that, unlike his omnipotent predecessor Kekkonen, he does not want to interfere in the domestic political decisionmaking process. This restraint of Koivisto's may result in a strengthening of Finnish democracy.

## 2. The Finnish Party Scene

According to Raschke, Finland--similarly as France and Italy--has an ideologically polarized multiparty system.<sup>43</sup> Raschke mentions several typical characteristics of this kind of party system: A large number of parties represented in the parliament; a high degree of polarization evidenced by a strong communist party and a comparatively weak extreme right; just as the extreme ideological wings are comparatively strong, so the parties forming the political center are comparatively weak; generally a socialist and a nonsocialist bloc vie for forming a majority; even the inclusion of communists in the government proceeds via coalitions with bourgeois parties.

Most of these criteria so far apply to the Finnish party system. At present eight parties are represented in the Diet. The Communist Party as a rule has a 20-percent share of the vote. One will, however, search in vain on the Finnish party scene for an extreme rightist party. In the comparatively weak center there are the Center Party and part of the Social Democrats. In the formation of a government the alternative is not popular front or bourgeois bloc, but coalitions cross both camps. In the past couple of years the model of a center-left coalition has been particularly durable--consisting of Social Democrats, the Center Party, the communist-dominated Finnish People's Democratic League and the Swedish People's Party.

In the past few months, however, there has been some movement on the Finnish party scene which places some of the characteristics of an ideologically polarized multiparty system in doubt. Basically these changes have not been triggered by the switch from Kekkonen to Koivisto, but it so happens that latent conflicts within the parties and changes in electoral structure are becoming clearly apparent at this time.

In the Social Democratic Party (SPD) one had hoped that Koivisto's great election victory would rub off on the party, but this hope apparently is not being fulfilled. In opinion polls after the election of Koivisto the SPD share in the vote again eroded to close to the party's 23.9-percent share in the 1979 elections. For the SPD it is difficult to "sell" Koivisto, who consciously is taking a stance above the parties, as a Social Democrat. Indeed Koivisto, who in accordance with tradition abandoned his party membership immediately after his election, is not necessarily tracing his victory to his membership in the SPD, saying: "Not a political program but a person was elected here."<sup>44</sup>

Despite the fact that in all probability the election of Koivisto will not be reflected in a greater vote for the SPD, the change in atmosphere resulting from Finland being headed for the first time by a Social Democrat must be considered a plus for the SPD. Thus the Social Democrats,



classified by the Soviet Union in postwar years as unreliable customers in foreign policy, have shown definitively that they must be counted among the parties constituting pillars of the state.

The Center Party, which in the person of Kekkonen had furnished the president for 25 years and had occupied important posts in most postwar years, suddenly saw itself removed from the most important levers of Finnish policy, particularly since it also did badly in the reshuffle of the government that had become necessary after the election of Koivisto. True, the latter is due to its awkward strategy in the government reshuffle. Koivisto was prepared to offer the Center the post of prime minister, but particularly the previous foreign minister of the Center, Paavo Vayrynen, wanted to continue to claim the post of foreign minister for the Center. This, in turn, Koivisto did not accept. And so it happened that the Center went emptyhanded when it was a question of the most important government posts: Social Democrat Kalevi Sorsa became prime minister, and Par Stenvack of the Swedish People's Party foreign minister. In addition to this loss in power, the Center Party has to cope with another problem. It must increasingly vie for bourgeois votes with the conservative party, which in the meantime has risen to the position of the second-strongest party. At the same time the Center, whose voters consist preponderantly of farmers and independently employed, must open up new strata of voters for itself to offset losses in its traditional supporters brought about by structural changes. The Center has received support from outside, however. A majority of the Liberal People's Party (3.7 percent of the vote in 1979, with four Diet deputies) decided to join the Center. This appears to be a vague indication of a trend away from the multiparty system.

The greatest difficulties at present are being faced by the Finnish Communist Party (SKP), which in effect is split into a reformist communist majority wing and an orthodox Stalinist minority wing. This dispute in the SKP has been simmering since the mid-1960's.<sup>45</sup> At the 19th party congress in May 1981 the probationally elected party leadership received instructions to make an attempt at achieving unity. Late in 1981, however, the situation in the SKP worsened when 11 deputies of the Stalinist wing were expelled from the parliamentary party of the People's Democratic League for disavowing the government, which also includes Communists of the majority wing. At the presidential election as well, the Stalinist electors, unlike the majority Communists, did not vote for Koivisto. Against this background, SKP Chairman Aarne Saarinen declared in late March 1982 that he would no longer be a candidate at the special congress called for mid-May. At the SKP special congress on 14/15 May 1982 in Helsinki, Saarinen then violently criticized the CPSU, which in his view shortly before the party congress had taken a stand of solid support for the Stalinist minority. After a chaotic congress, again a majority Communist (though not one programmed for definite confrontation), Minister of Labor Jouko Kajanoja, was elected party chief, and the (again a little more moderate) Stalinist Seppo Toiviainen was elected his deputy. But immediately after the election Toiviainen and the 2 other Stalinist members of the 10-member SKP Politburo declared that they were no longer available for work in the top leadership. "In clear text, this announcement amounts to a formal confirmation of the break in the SKP

which has existed de facto for years."<sup>46</sup> In light of these quarrels in the SKP, the party is increasingly losing support among the voters.

These briefly sketched changes on the Finnish party scene may also have repercussions on possible new coalitions after the Diet elections next year. Thus it cannot be ruled out that the conservative party, which has been increasing in strength all the time and has been in opposition since 1966, will be taken into a coalition while the Communists will stay outside. Speculation is also going on about a coalition of Communists, Socialists and conservatives, with the Center Party left holding the short end of the stick.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Cf Werner Adam, "Interregnum in Finland, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ) 21 Oct 81.
2. To point up the differences from the time between independence, 1919, and the war, postwar Finland was called the "second republic."
3. Cf FAZ 23 Sep 81 and 12 Oct 81.
4. In fall 1958 a serious crisis between Finland and the Soviet Union occurred because Moscow suspected the government under Social Democrat Fagerholm of deviating from Finland's previous course. Late in 1958 this so-called night frost government resigned.
5. Cf NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG (NZZ) 18 Jan 82.
6. Cf NZZ 29 Jan 82.
7. Cf FAZ 28 Jan 82.
8. Cf NZZ 15 Jan 82.
9. Cf FAZ 11 Mar 82.
10. Cf NZZ 11 Mar 82.
11. Quoted from DIE WELT 13 Mar 82.
12. Text of speech in ULKOPOLITIIKKA 2/1982 p 64.
13. Jan Magnus Jansson, "An Expanding Foreign Policy," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1975, p 4.
14. Ibid.
15. Text in H. Peter Krosby, "Friede fuer Europas Norden" [Peace for Northern Europe], Duesseldorf, 1981, p 413 ff.

16. Quoted from Krosby, loc cit, p 63.
17. Quoted from Krosby, loc cit, p 65.
18. Text in Ulrich Wagner, "Finlands Neutralitaet" [Finnish Neutrality], Hambur, 1974, p 201 ff.
19. Ibid.
20. Text of address in Wagner, loc cit, p 208.
21. Urho Kekkonen, "Gedanken eines Praesidenten" [Thoughts of a President], Duesseldorf, 1979, p 50.
22. Of Krosby, loc cit, p 165 ff.
23. Cf Kari Mottola, "The Finnish-Soviet Long-Term Programme--a chart of cooperation," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1977, p 43 ff.
24. Kekkonen, loc cit, p 109.
25. Erik von Knorre, "The EEC Should Honor Kelsinki's Liberal Trade Policy," HNADELSBLATT 11 May 82.
26. Ahti Karjalainen, "Finland's Share in Establishing European Security," EUROPA-ARCHIV 2/1970, p 43.
27. Cf Kekkonen, loc cit, p 71 ff.
28. Klaus Tornudd, "Finnish Security Policy," EUROPA-ARCHIV 23/1979, p 735.
29. Cf the article by Nils Andren in the supplement.
30. Quoted from Paavo Vayrynen, "Finnish Foreign Policy in Today's World," AUSSENPOLITIK 1/1979, p 4.
31. Cf Wagner, loc cit, p 38 f.
32. Max Jakobson, "Finnlands Neutralitaetspolitik zwischen Ost und West" [Finnish Policy of Neutrality Between East and West], Duesseldorf, 1969, p 94.
33. Ibid, p 96.
34. Tornudd, loc cit, p 733.
35. Krosby, loc cit, p 388.
36. Text in EUROPA-ARCHIV 13/1969, p D309 f.

37. Kekkonen, loc cit, p 95 f.
38. Paavo Kastari, "The Finnish Constitution and Its Development," in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed), "Die Verfassung Finnlands" [The Finnish Constitution], 1972, p 8.
39. Ibid, p 14.
40. L. A. Puntila, "Politische Gesxhichte Finnlands" [Finnish Political History], 1980, p 274.
41. Cf FAZ 28 Jan 82.
42. Interview in DER SPIEGEL 5/1982, p 120.
43. Cf Joachim Raschke (ed), "Die Politischen Parteien in Westeuropa" [The Political Parties in Western Europe], Reinbek, 1978, p 23 f.
44. DER SPIEGEL, loc cit, p 120.
45. Concerning the disputes in the SKP cf Ulrich Wagner, "Finnlands Kommunisten" [Finland's Communists], Stuttgart, 1971, and John H. Hodgson, "The Left in Finnish Politics," in Hans Ruehle/Hans-Joachim Veen (ed), "Sozialistische und kommunistische Parteien in Westeuropa" [Socialist and Communist Parties in Western Europe], vol 2; Nordlander, Opladen, 1979, p 304 ff.
46. Werner Adam, "The Finnish Communists Before a Final Split," FAZ 17 May 82.

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CSO: 3620/83

## BRIEFS

SINISALO REJECTS THIRD-LINER'S CHARGE--Taisto Sinisalo, the former leader of the SKP's minority, does not join in the concept presented by third-liner Aulis Juvela (Communist) that the division among Communists is being increased by the bourgeois backgrounds of present Stalinists. According to Sinisalo, Juvela's method of thinking has been brought up even before, but primarily as an attack against the TIEDONANATAJA group. Juvela sees in Stalinists fanatics whose Marxism is based on phrases learned by rote. According to SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto there is a feeling of disappointment in the minority within the SKDL now that the situation has become weaker even though the meeting of the SKDL's Joint Council in the spring offered promises for the strengthening of unity. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 26 Oct 82 p 8]

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CSO: 3617/25



## MAUROY WARNS AGAINST PSF CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 21/22 Nov 82 p 5

[Article by Jean-Yves Lhorneau]

[Text] Mr Pierre Mauroy--who took the floor at the end of the morning on Saturday, 20 November before the PS steering committee meeting in Paris--warned the socialists against the divisions by which some of them could be tempted. "United, we will succeed; divided, we will fail," said the prime minister among other things, before asking the Socialist Party to carry out the government's activities rather than to criticize them. If there must be criticism, he explained, it must be brought before the party whose job it is to arbitrate.

Following a lengthy argument in support of the austerity policy, Mr Mauroy regretted his speech since, in his eyes, after last 4 November the harshest public criticism came from the ranks of the PS itself. He reaffirmed that the government is not making a "gift" to business owners, but that it is trying to help enterprises with the understanding that this assistance must be related to the investment effort. He felt that the assistance is all the more necessary since the Left cannot make a success of its economic policy by relying on the public sector alone and that it is therefore necessary to obtain the cooperation of the private sector.

Previously, Mr Jean Poperen, the number two PS official who had opened the discussions, had repeated the Socialists' request for a statement of industrial investments and of the use of various public assistance to enterprises.

If one abides by the indexes, the freeze has been a technical success. The government thinks that it will win the first wager on inflation: less than a 10 percent increase in prices in 1982. Unemployment seems to be leveling off. The "austerity policy" is no longer frightening and the Socialists agree in maintaining that its necessity is perceived by the public.

One might reasonably think that with the figures to support it the government would manage to prove that the formerly united Socialists have some competency in economic affairs. However, the problem seems to have returned. The prime minister's image is not profiting from the successes on which his government prides itself.\* Once again, the message is not getting through.

This is probably because the message is obscured by concerns expressed by some Socialists within the party and among elected officials. This is also because the government has risked altering the consistency of the message, at least so it appears.

These past few weeks the Socialists have addressed numerous warnings to the government on wage policy and economic choices for "a way out of the crisis" in particular. The prime minister returned the "compliment" to his friends during the PS steering committee meeting on Saturday. Any split within the Socialist Party, he said in substance, could be repaired only through an evaluation of government policy. And this policy is nothing but the translation of the orientations defined by the president of the Republic.

Conflicting speeches show that everything has not been said. Mr Mauroy is administering the head of state's word in his pragmatic manner, leaving himself a margin for improvisation. The style is not always understood.

#### Good Intentions

The example of wage policy is significant. The government had promised that SMIC purchasing power would increase 4 percent this year. After Mr Jacques Delors announced that this promise would not be kept by the end of 1982, Mr Mauroy stated that it would--at the beginning of 1983. The government will therefore respect its commitment with some delay, but, through statements and corrections, Messrs Delors and Mauroy have lessened the value of their word and at the same time cast doubt upon their ability to "keep" the new books.

The same is true of civil servant purchasing power. In proposing to the unions a "safeguard clause" intended to guarantee purchasing power for these wage earner categories in 1982 and 1983 the government may be suspected of reintroducing the variable wage scale. However, eliminating it was one of the major lines of its new economic policy. Even if the overall coherence of this policy--austerity and social justice--has not been disturbed, its perception by the public threatens to be.

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\* According to the monthly IFOP poll (published by FRANCE-SOIR and taken from 10 to 16 November using a sample of 1,145 people), 37 percent of the subjects questioned are "satisfied" with Mr Mauroy (he loses 4 points) and 47 percent are dissatisfied (plus 1 point).

Things go wrong when certain Socialist Party elected officials and leaders add to the confusion and not always purposely. This is the case when, like Mr Andre Laignel, one becomes concerned about gifts to management. This is also the case of the more numerous persons who are astonished that the government is giving up its promise on SMIC purchasing power in favor of a few months of respite.

The attitude of each arises from excellent intentions: it is a matter of warning the government against the risk of a split between it and part of its social, and therefore electoral, base. But it is possible that this action is achieving the opposite of the desired effect by providing an image of a contested, indecisive administration and one which in the end is not respecting its commitments.

Mr Jean-Paul Bachy brought this concern before the steering committee. In fact, the national secretary for enterprises stressed that blows against the head of the government are all the more dangerous since the Socialists--considering what he calls the "selective" nature of PCF support--are the only force capable of carrying out the administration's policy.

Under these conditions, neither is the action of Mr Jean-Pierre Chevenement's CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education] without its risks. Mr Michel Charzat reported in our columns (LE MONDE 18 November) on the temptation that he perceived within the government to subject France to a 2-year purge while awaiting world economic recovery. Mr Jacques Delors, minister of economy and finance, is not named, but he is alluded to and accused by implication of liberal orthodoxy and leftist "Barrism."

If this temptation does exist--it was already analyzed several months ago within the PS leadership itself--it is a minority and isolated trend today. The desire for industrial reconquest, the call for austerity and effort accompanied by the correction of injustices--"asking more of he who has more, asking less of he who has so little"--contained in the speech given by Mitterrand in Figeac on 27 September and then picked up by Mr Mauroy on 4 November are a good indication of this.

The fact remains that although he favors the leftist administration's "external credibility"--to use an expression dear to the CERES--Mr Delors benefits from an indisputable "internal credibility" on the part of French public opinion himself. The polls attest to it. And, among Socialists it is greatly feared that the pedagogic abilities of the minister of economy and finance will end up, despite him, lending credit to the idea that under the constraints of the crisis the leftist government is conducting a policy little different from the one that a rightwing government would have conducted. Mr Delors explains that perceived abroad the effect of an announcement of a promise on the SMIC not being kept brings an influx of currency to France. The Socialists answer him that he is making them lose a bundle of votes. For the party, the debate appears in terms as plain as this.

The leadership of the Socialist Party is concerned with this break. Mr Jean Poperen, number two in the Socialist Party, expressed this when his party's steering committee session opened on Saturday, 20 November, in commenting that management is still not playing the game of "compromise" that the administration is supposed to establish between social and economic forces with interests that are sometimes contradictory. "If management were to continue to raise the stakes," he said, "neither the government, nor the Socialist Party, nor the unions would be able to restrain the workers." This consideration, at least, is capable of uniting all the Socialists. To some extent it is probably used for this purpose.

#### The Strong Method

The "compromise" method that the Socialists persist in recommending for external use was not a success itself in the matter of the bill intended to wipe out the last traces of the Algerian war. After the party and the Socialist Group in the National Assembly blocked the president of the Republic's desire not to split the pardon and thus to include the "criminal" generals under the law, the government was to use the strong method in the National Assembly on Tuesday, 23 November.

Mr Pierre Mauroy would be authorized by the Council of Ministers meeting on the same day to take responsibility for his government under Article 49, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution. According to this article, the bill in discussion is adopted without a vote unless a vote of censure is introduced within 24 hours. Without the power to express themselves in full, the Socialist representatives, whose decision had been inspired by Mr Joxe, president of the group, and the party will therefore be obliged to support the government by their absence, nonattendance and silence.

The institutions of the Fifth Republic, which Mr Mitterrand has adapted to his best interests after having contested them, enable the executive to override the pressure of the parties and of the Parliament which support him as long as they are loyal to him on the basics. They do not permit cutting off discussions, debates and timely disputes.

This is fortunate for the Socialists who hope to "inspire the executive"; it is harmful to the prime minister so long as the Socialist Party and its representatives react after the fact rather than "inspiring the government" before it makes its decisions.

9693

CSO: 3519/140

## POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION ANALYZED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 26 Oct 82 p 6

[Article by Ang. Stangos]

[Text] This year's municipal elections showed a number of peculiarities, the chief one being that they allowed all the parties--and in both rounds--the luxury of declaring their satisfaction with the outcome, and at the same time advancing arguments in justification of their claim.

However, in reality the big winner in the municipal elections is the "democratic form of government," and not because the voters made their choices in an atmosphere of calm, order, and security.

The "democratic form of government" has won because anticommunism was given the coup de grace and has now ceased being a primary characteristic of the country's political life. This anticommunism had been based on our civil-war past and on personal hatreds, and not on ideological arguments or social-economic alignments.

In the future, no political faction will find it easy to draw votes and generate popular support by promoting a climate of polarization, hysteria, and division.

In the second round of the municipal elections the other day, a step was taken towards national reconciliation which was as significant as the recent recognition of the National Resistance by the Chamber of Deputies. And the New Democracy Party played a conflicting role with respect to these two great steps, showing beyond all doubt that its leadership has been left behind by the times and continues to live in a past which does not carry any special weight today.

## National Reconciliation

In the Chamber of Deputies, the leadership of the New Democracy Party refused to take part in the national reconciliation, withdrawing instead at the beginning of the discussion on the bill for the recognition of the National Resistance. Two months later, the constituency of the New Democracy did not hesitate to vote above all for the KKE but also for PASOK in the second round of the municipal elections, in those municipalities where these two parties were opposed, because the ND candidate had come third in the balloting of the first round and consequently did not participate in the second round.



It is certain that many factors played a role in the choice which the voters on the Right made in the second round--in the 37 municipalities where PASOK was opposed by the KKE, 23 were won by the KKE and 14 were won by PASOK, and of course the governing element was the ND voters. The personality of the candidate played a role, and for this reason in some places the rightist voters supported PASOK--in Peristeri, Polikhni, Khaidari, Ymittos--and elsewhere they preferred the KKE, such as in Ano Liosia, Glyfada, Neapoli. A role was also played by the preference which was shown in most cases by the rightist voters, or at least a large percentage of them, toward the candidate who happened to be the mayor. Finally, the fact played a role that the rightist voters did not want to support the party of the administration, choosing instead to give it losses, even if this meant that they were forced to vote for parties more to the Left than it is. For this reason, as a general observation it can be asserted that the KKE won the votes of a greater percentage of rightists than PASOK did in the second round of the municipal elections.

#### The Old Dogma

It would be unrealistic to assert in any way that however few were the rightist voters who voted for PASOK or the KKE, they would repeat something similar if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. They will return to their faction, but the fact alone that they have behaved as citizens and did not abstain or did not cast blank ballots shows that they have overcome the old dogmas in the practice of politics by the Right. But these were dogmas in terms of which Ev. Averof insisted on defining the policy of the New Democracy, and thus preserving an unrealistic situation. And it did not dare to promulgate a slogan on boycotting or casting blank ballots, simply because this would not have been accepted, at which point its position would immediately have become difficult in an objective sense.

It is now obvious that the electoral behavior of the constituency of the Right is creating a problem for the New Democracy, and above all for its leadership. It cannot possibly sustain its policy of the past, since the ordinary voter has gone beyond this, but at the same time it is very doubtful whether Evag. Averof will prove to be flexible enough in a very short period of time to adjust to the present circumstances. The identification for decades between the party's and the State's mechanism has functioned to the benefit of the Right when it was in power. Now that it is not in power, it has lost its contact with the popular rank and file, precisely because it has no rank-and-file organizations of its own. And now it should be expected that the present leadership will pay for the existence of this vacuum, despite the fact that in the large cities the New Democracy has maintained its strength.

But whereas on the Right the step towards national reconciliation was made by the rank and file, in the KKE the process has been insisted on by the leadership of the party. Because the entire effort of the leadership of the KKE since the time when it was made legal has been to impress its existence on the political life of the country as something ordinary, and to not be restricted to a corner of the country's political life. It is characteristic that in the official and unofficial phraseology of the KKE, the polarizing terms "antidemocratic forces" or "forces of the Right" were replaced by the more moderate "conservative forces," or "conservative voters."

There is no doubt that the KKE has gained from the municipal elections. It figures that it has elected 45 mayors, but its chief reasons are that it has been accepted also by other political-ideological classes of the population, as was shown by the second round, and finally that the myths and prejudices against it have been demolished. And it believes that this will have a repercussion on the country's general political life.

#### Celebrations and Inferences

For PASOK, the municipal elections provide the occasion for celebrations, but also for inferences. Celebrations, because it increased overwhelmingly its power in the smaller communities, which means that it is in control of the basic units of social life, and that the rural community remains on the side of the government. And celebrations also because it has increased significantly its control over the municipalities, since the candidates which were supported by the governing party won in 167 municipalities.

But on the other hand certain inferences should emerge as well, because in the large cities defections of voters were observed, mainly towards the Left, while also the selection of a candidate often proved a failure, resulting in a loss of support. But on the whole the government should be pleased, because the damage was not great and the defections occurred in the direction of the Left, a fact which means that to the extent which this translates into dissatisfaction, it is a dissatisfaction with the things which are not being done and not with the things which are being done. And there exists in any case the well-founded hope that these voters will return when parliamentary elections take place, and when the danger will be coming from the Right.

Moreover, Andreas G. Papandreou himself, in his interview with foreign correspondents, suggested that 48 percent of PASOK's support came from a non-permanent contingent, from both the Right and Left, as was shown also by the elections for the European Parliament. And this means that there is leeway for explaining certain losses. And nevertheless, substantial losses not only did not exist, but on the contrary the figures justify positive assessments.

12114

CSO: 3521/58

## LACK OF OBJECTIVITY IN PRESS REPORTING LAMENTED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 25 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] The fact that all the Greek parties (whether at odds with each other or cooperating secretly or openly, whether they distrust one another or try to undermine each other) have hastened to crow--at the highest pitch possible--about yesterday's final outcome of the municipal elections is perhaps the saddest political phenomenon in recent years. It presages a process of sinking down to the level of unscrupulous lying, which itself constitutes a rejection of democracy, since it aims at the deception of the people.

And in fact the most unsophisticated citizen is able to understand that with the opening of the ballot boxes it is not possible for everybody to emerge a winner. Inevitably there will be losers in the balloting as well. Therefore those who while falling into the latter category are nevertheless acting like enthusiastic victors are not deceiving merely themselves (something which would just fall within the province of political psychopathology). In the most shameless fashion, they are acting indecently with respect to the public, which has learned how to study the figures and to infer sound conclusions from making comparisons.

The figures, which the governing party began to avoid some time ago like the Devil avoids incense or Satan shuns garlic, are even more unkind than they were in the first round. And they show one fact above all: That a large percentage of the people who have been adherents of PASOK for years chose to condemn its policy. With forcefulness. Indeed, with a forcefulness growing from one Sunday to the other.

Last Monday, there were more than a few pedestrians on the streets of Athens who, after stopping in front of the posted newspapers and reading the thunderous inconsistencies of their titles, became indignant (to the point of hurling oaths or making insulting gestures) at the infuriating inability of the entire Greek press to furnish a minimum of objective information and credible assessment.

In these two-phase elections for choosing the leaders of local self-government (concerning which the governing party has made such a fuss, asserting that its aim is to promote this for the sake of a more direct and more extensive democracy), there was an unpropitious reappearance of many characteristics of former times which had been almost forgotten, and in any case condemned in the minds of the Greek people: The shameless government partisanship, the practicing of psychological violence (all the more intense the smaller the arena was where

it manifested itself), the hooliganism, the squandering of public money, the brazen support given to government factions by ministers appearing on balconies like traveling salesmen, and the nauseating (literally) brainwashing by the electronic media, which was topped off by the involvement of the enthusiastic--divine ingenuousness!--Andreas Papandreou.

Other columns are analyzing by means of dry figures not only the unshakable comparative data on how much this behavior and its underrating of the intelligence of the Greek people has cost to PASOK, but also its sometimes unacknowledged and sometimes trumpeted popular-front ruses. From this column and for today (and with much regret) we will confine ourselves to noting that the very lucid, clear-cut, and healthy atmosphere with which the New Democracy Party conducted all the most important elections already has grown dangerously clouded and has been defiled by the political opacity which PASOK now represents to the country.

12114

CSO: 3521/58

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO KKE

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 28 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] The Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador sent to the Central Committee of the KKE the following congratulatory message:

"Dear comrades,

"On behalf of the Communist Party of El Salvador, we express our congratulations to the KKE for its victory in the recent elections. This victory of the Greek communists, which is a victory for the Greek people, fills us with gladness because it means a significant furtherance of the fight against imperialism, and for democracy, national independence, peace, and socialism.

"With comradely salutations,

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador."

Also, the secretary general of the Communist Party of Spain sent the following telegram:

"Please accept our sincere congratulations on your electoral victory, which will contribute to the strengthening of democracy and the struggle for peace and socialism.

"Santiago Cariglio

"Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain."

Finally, the Party Organization of Greece of the Palestine Communist Party sent the following message to the KKE, the "fraternal, esteemed communist party of Greece," as it calls this party:

"We have been following attentively the significant successes of the KKE and of all the democratic forces in the municipal elections. The results of these elections have constituted a triumphant victory for the forces of progress and genuine change. We send you warm congratulations on the great advancement which your party has seen in the municipal elections.

"Party Organization of Greece of the Palestine Communist Party."



## BRIEFS

POLITICAL REFUGEES' REPATRIATION--Very soon, the government will be issuing announcements on the matter of the unrestricted repatriation of the political refugees, it was stated yesterday by Minister of Public Order Skoularikis. He explained that those repatriated will be able to settle wherever they wish and that programs are being prepared for those without homes or property. Mr. Skoularikis repeated once again that no dossiers on the political convictions of citizens are being used today, and he added: "The government is not interested in the political alignment of each citizen--and in any case such alignments are known to the whole Greek nation from the legitimate functioning of the parties and the activities carried on within them." [Text] [Athens TA NEA in Greek 27 Oct 82 p 1] 12114

CSO: 3521/58

## CP CHAIRMAN WELCOMES ELECTION CANDIDATES FROM OUTSIDE PARTY

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 5 Nov 82 p 7

[Article by Kare Andre Nilsen: "CP Chairman Says of Next Year's Election-- Our Lists Will Be Open For Those Without Parties"]

[Excerpts] Peace--jobs--expanded democracy. These will be the leading words for the NKP [Norwegian Communist Party] in next year's municipal and county elections. At the national committee meeting a couple of weeks ago it was decided that the party will stand for election all over the country. The preparatory work is now going on in local teams and county parties. An election group is now being established which, together with the party's political leadership, will lead and coordinate the election campaign until September of next year.

## Most Dangerous Situation Since the War

"Next year's election will be a very important event," said the chairman of NKP, Hans I. Kleven. "In several ways we find ourselves in a different economic and political situation than we were in only a short time ago."

"What aspects are you thinking about?"

"In the first place, the tense international situation. We are living in perhaps the most dangerous situation since the war. American imperialism is rattling its weapons. At the same time we are experiencing an increase in inter-imperialist opposition. Capitalistic competition on the capitalist world market is especially increasing. The leading problem of capitalism is the market problem. In the capitalistic world we are experiencing not only a cyclic economic crisis, but a more permanent and structural crisis resulting from technological developments. Unemployment is increasing with record speed. These circumstances are now beginning to make themselves felt in our country. Segment after segment is encountering increasing problems."

## The Choice for Our Country

"Do you therefore see the county elections related to what is going to happen in the Storting election in 1985?"

"Actually the situation calls for joint action among all the leftwing forces in the entire labor movement, yes, joint action among all the forces which will defend that which has been gained, and develop and expand democracy. The situation should therefore justify broad election cooperation among these forces based on a joint election campaign. For its part, NKP will support every step in this direction. It is now a matter of what political course will be followed in the future in our country. The question is: Will the current turn to the Right be allowed to continue?"

"The choice is between a foreign policy which binds Norway even closer to the nuclear strategy of United States imperialism, or a foreign and security policy which is for our national benefit. The choice is between an economic policy which turns over more and more to the market forces, meaning the domestic and foreign monopolies, with dangerously high unemployment as the result, or an economic policy based on social planning and control of both investment and export."

## Broad Cooperation Necessary

"The decisive thing now is above all that the working classes, together with all other democratic forces, must strengthen their commitment to their own interests, meaning their commitment to peace, jobs for all, social rights, and meeting the material and cultural needs of the people.

"We see," said Kleven, "the beginnings of such a commitment primarily outside the parliamentary arena, in the peace movement and the labor movement. It would have been both natural and desirable to have correspondingly broad cooperation also on the party-political scene, in any case within the labor movement. That would have been an effective and unified answer to the challenge represented by the rightwing forces. If we are to stop the turn to the right, the labor movement must distinguish itself as a clear contrast to the rightwing government line.

"It must form a line of confrontation with a clear alternative, and not just a line of criticism of disconnected parts, supplemented with recommendations for some budget additions here and there."

## NKP Lists Are Open For Those Without a Party

"Do you see any possibility for such cooperation within the labor movement?"

"I want to emphasize that this is a main point of ours. Wherever possible we will try to get it in one form or another.

"We are realistic, however, and realize that the possibilities for joint action with the Socialist Left Party or the Labor Party are very small at the moment. Both are betting on winning the largest possible party-political gains with pure lists. Election cooperation in the county elections therefore seems very remote.

"The possibilities are probably greater in the municipal elections. But here also the possibilities for cooperation seem to be greatest with left-wing groups who are without a party. Our lists will obviously be open for people without party ties," said Hans I. Kleven, who complains that the process has not developed so far that there is natural fertile soil before the situation demands it, namely a unified grouping of a democratic alternative against the Right."

#### Direction of NKP's Election Campaign

"What goals do you intend as a basis for NKP in the local elections?"

"They will be the main issues that we are going to promote. Our election campaign will be largely concentrated on peace work and economic policies. The direction of our election campaign will always be the struggle against the forces of the Right, emphasis on our demands for another policy, and another policy in relation to the traditionally social democratic policies. It will be important for us to emphasize the party as much as possible, and make our viewpoints known, both on the actual political and economic issues and on the more basic ideological questions.

"As to the election results themselves, we start with the statistic which shows an almost continuous retreat over a number of years for our party, both in the Storting elections and the local elections. That is something we must soberly face. Unrealistic expectations will only damage ourselves. We realize that it is a very difficult task to reverse this tendency. Furthermore it does not depend only on ourselves. It also depends on changes in the situation; the international situation among others.

"Our party is therefore going to participate with the forces of the people. We will present lists in as many counties and municipalities as possible," said the chairman of NKP.

9287

CSO: 3639/33

## 'ORCHID' FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM ON AMX 30 B2 TANKS

Paris DEFENCE AND ARMAMENT in English Oct 82 p 39

[Text] 1 afocal module  
 1 electro-inertial rack  
 1 coupling panel  
 1 tank commander's electronic control box  
 1 separate night TV system (Canasta)

**T**he Orchid system consists of the APX M 586 automatic day fire control system linked to the Canasta night vision sensor. It is based on the fire control system selected by the French Army for its AMX-30 B2 tanks. GIAT offers the Orchid system for retrofit to tanks fitted with a telescopic sight, notably the AMX-13, AMX-30, M-48 and T-55.

The main advantage of this modular system is its capability of strongly improving first-round impact probability and response time without requiring extensive modifications to the tank. Its cost (70-80 percent of the COTAC) is quite acceptable.

The afocal module, with x1 magnification, installed in an armoured housing, comprises an optical board for mixing the visible and IR beams, an error display sight and a laser rangefinder.

This unit is mounted directly onto a support, fastened to the gun mantlet, in front of the day firing sight.

The neodyme-YAG rod laser rangefinder operates on a transmission wavelength of 1.064 micron. Measurements between 320 and 9995 metres are made at a rate of one pulse every 2 seconds or 12 per minute, with an accuracy of  $\pm 5$  m.

The electro-inertial rack comprises the computer, the gyrometer and the cant sensor.

The computer takes automatically into account:

- target range (laser rangefinding)

- target speed (elevation/traverse)
- cant of the firing vehicle (sensor)

Other parameters are entered manually via the tank commander's control box:

- shell type (4 selectable types)
- cross-wind (5 positions)
- altitude (3 positions: 0-500, 500-1000 and 1000-1500 m)

The overall accuracy published by GIAT for this fire control system is 0.2 mill.

The total duration of a firing sequence is between 5 and 12 seconds.

Of modular design, the Canasta night vision sensor comprises a LLL TV camera installed on the gun mantlet, one or two TV monitors for the tank commander and gunner and a tank commander's control panel.

The Canasta is a fully passive system, also usable by day, capable of engaging targets at a range of up to 2000 metres depending on the degree of darkness.

The lighting range goes from  $10^{-4}$  lux to  $10^{+2}$  lux in night position and from  $10^{-1}$  lux to  $10^{+5}$  lux in day position.

Besides the camera operating, control and adjustment functions, the control panel also ensures coordination of the camera and gun, manual entry of firing corrections from the target range and the ammunition type selected as well as automatic input of the firing corrections coming from the computer.

Two complementary simulators are available:

- the APX M 623 simulator, based on a separate TV system for basic training,
- the DX 154 simulator, made by Giravions Dorand Industrie, which is a more complete system designed for direct installation on the Orchid and tank-mounted units.

Adaptation to Soviet T-series tanks is possible but entails difficulties due to the differences between the tank series. [photo caption]

CSO: 3500/7



MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

VALUE OF AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT--The total value of the recently-awarded contract for the supply of 18 Aerospatiale AS 350B light helicopters is \$A 23.6, including \$A 13.4 for the helicopters themselves. Twelve machines will replace the Bell UH-1Bs used by the Royal Australian Air Force for aircrew training, while the other six, some of which will probably be deployed on the RAN's new FFSG frigates, will be used by the Navy for surveillance and liaison duties. [Text] [Paris DEFENCE AND ARMAMENT in English Oct 82 p 7]

CSO: 3500/7

## MASKED MARCHING SOLDIERS ISSUE FOLLOWED UP

## Masked Soldiers Arrested

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 18 Nov 82 p 1

/Text/ The participation in yesterday's march of masked uniformed men created a particular sensation. There were 25 soldiers, 13 navy men, 17 air cadets, 1 naval officer and 7 army officers--a total of 57. Following the march, members of the police force followed them and finally arrested them in the Ambelokipoi area while they were changing into civilian clothes. Two of them were identified as Panagiotis Latsis, 20, (sailor serving at the Palaska Training Center) and Emmanouil K. Katris, a soldier with the Ninth Infantry Regiment at Kalamata. Two more were arrested but did not provide information and are being held until their identification is established.

It should be noted that during the march the slogans used by the uniformed men were: "Massive Movement In and Out of the Army"; "The Soldiers' Suicides are Assassinations of the Militarists." Using a loudspeaker they also announced the following: "Let Drosogiannis /National Defense deputy minister/ safeguard the right of free opinion instead of saying that we are disguised citizens."

The masked servicemen held banners with the slogans: "The Soldier is a Citizen, a Working Man"; "Military Courts, Military Police Imprisonment Should Be Abolished"; "Democratic Syndicalist Freedoms in the Army"; "12 Month Military Service," et al.

## Court Martial

Athens TA NEA in Greek 19 Nov 82 pp 1, 15

/Text/ Sailor Panagiotis Latsis and soldier Emm. Katris who were arrested for participating in the Polytechnic School march will be courtmartialed according to reports by sources of the National Defense Ministry which is in charge of the case following the transfer of the two men to the navy and military police respectively. At the same time, Deputy Defense Minister Andonis Drosogiannis was expected to make a statement this morning on this subject explaining the government's position.

## "Delicate" Matter

The problem created by the arrest of the two and the participation of armed forces men in the march was characterized yesterday by ministry circles as a "very delicate" matter especially since Drosogiannis refused to make any statement though pressured by newsmen. Senior army officers pointed out yesterday--regardless of their personal position on the matter--that the government was taken by surprise and for this reason it avoided taking a position before investigating the problem thoroughly.

It was made known that soldier Katris was in Athens (away from the Ninth Infantry Regiment in Kalamata where he served) without permission from his unit; that the sailor and the soldier were arrested on police orders "from above"; and that the Ministry of National Defense is already investigating the participation of armed forces men in the march in an effort to establish whether there is some "plan" calling for similar actions.

Beyond these facts, however, a senior retired army officer told TA NEA: "No doubt many things related to the living conditions as well as with the soldiers' rights must change. The problem, however, is not to confuse democratization with military discipline without which no army whatever can function." He added: "In most European countries the soldiers are unionized. This does not mean, however, that they can overlook the indispensable requirements for the army's functioning. I suspect very much that the men who participated in the march have in mind a different meaning when they speak about democratization of the armed forces."

## Qualified Permission

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 20-21 Nov 82 p 1

/Text/ As a result of the fuss about the participation of uniformed men in the Polytechnic School march, Deputy Defense Minister Drosogiannis told newsmen yesterday that persons in the services can freely participate in official national events similar to that of the Polytechnic march. He made it clear, however, that while participating in uniform they are definitely forbidden to carry placards or shout slogans.

In the meantime, sailor P. Latsis and Emm. Katris who were arrested after the march were sentenced to 15 days imprisonment because of their breach of discipline for "adulterating the uniform" by wearing masks. In addition, an administrative investigation by jury was ordered for sailor P. Latsis because he left his unit in the Votanikos area without permission. At the same time, a similar investigation was ordered for both prisoners in an effort to find out if and to what extent they were connected with the banner they held and with the slogans the 46 uniformed men shouted while marching.

7520  
CSO: 3521/85

## ARMS MERCHANT ROLE FOLLOWING 'EXPO 82' LAMENTED

Athens RIZOSPASTIS 7 IMERES in Greek 31 Oct 82 pp 12-13

/Article by Nikos Fotakis/

/Text/ Therefore, the issue --for the government-- is how the gun of the racist Union of South Africa is a bad gun that cannot be associated with the...good gun of the other war industries which were gathered together the week before last on the Tzelepi beach.

The Tzelepi beach --if you do not know it-- is one of the jetties of the number one port of the country, namely Piraeus. There, in an area of some few thousand square meters, was held the weapons exhibit called "Defandory Expo 82."

If the matter were restricted to the dimensions of the area covered by the exhibit, the problem, at any rate, would not have been so serious (and we must say that all efforts undertaken by all sides was for this exhibit not to go beyond the closed area of the Tzelepi beach and those directly interested in their products). However, the Tzelepi beach did not represent only itself. Neither did it represent Piraeus alone. It represented Greece, and in this sense it is worthwhile that we examine the issue.

On the next to the last day of the exhibit, Greek authorities suddenly discovered that there was a South African machine gun among the weapons systems.

Following the discovery, the Ministry of National Defense gave a major general an order to visit the area and look into the charge. The check was, in fact, made and it was determined that the charge was correct and so the wing of the racists was closed down only a few hours before the rest of the wings closed since the exhibit itself was shutting its doors...

We must, of course, say that there was some noise --that is, as much as was needed-- in the newspapers over the scapegoat gun. However, everybody who gathered in our country were alike in not seeing the trees for the forest (of guns). In other words, dimensions were given to one --as serious as it is-- event and nothing was said about the war exhibit itself, in a country and by a government that must follow a policy of peace in the region....

It Was an Exhibit For a Few...

Little information escaped from the exhibit area. Its organizers had taken care to prohibit entry to reporters... It was an exhibit by a few for a few. Exhibitors were 180 industrialists of disaster coming from the capitalist countries of West Europe and America. Visitors were representatives of countries of the Middle and Near East, Far East, Africa and South America. Near them were also the well-known "men without country," that is, those...free entrepreneurs who trade in disaster.

The relevant prospectuses of the exhibit included messages from their co-organizers. All hail the attempt made to have our country become the middleman of dangerous products of imperialism for virgin markets. None of them, of course, acknowledge this so openly. They say it in...their own words.

Deputy Minister of National Defense P. Zakolikos said the following:

"This exhibit is taking place in our country which is the place where Europe meets with Asia and Africa. The fact that about 180 industries from 17 countries are exhibiting and that representatives from about 30 countries of the Middle and Near East, Africa and South America will visit it prejudices its certain success."

Mr D. Papanikas, chairman of the board of the EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry], said the following:

"It is not by chance that Greece is the place for the holding of this exhibit. Situated geographically in the middle of the European, Middle Eastern and African area, at the crossroads of three continents, Greece is the ideal place for the development of every kind of activity, much more in such sensitive fields as defense..."

Mr V. Karytinis, president of "Stager Hellas," said:

"Greece, because of her geographic location, is the most suitable spot for and completely serves the purpose of the exhibit. The criticalness of the times, and especially the events and developments in the Middle East area, create all the conditions for the success of the exhibit (!) and anticipate the interest of its visitors!"

Statements After Trips...

The ground for such messages had been prepared by the prime minister of the country himself, Mr Papandreou.

At the beginning of February on his return from Bonn, Mr Papandreou told reporters, "Unfortunately for a socialist government, we must say that we too are obliged to get into the arms purchases game..."



In Kuwait, Mr Papandreou referred to the possibilities that advocate the expansion of the activities of the war industry in our country, specifically with the Persian Gulf defense agreement.

This agreement, it must be emphasized, is being undertaken on the initiative of Saudi Arabia with the participation of Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and concerns a mutual support treaty of the above-mentioned countries whenever their internal security is endangered! In other words, it relates to the armament of reactionary regimes which agreed to mutually support each other against their common enemy: the popular progressive movement.

#### An Interesting Discussion

"Defandory Expo 82" is the fourth war materiel exhibit held in our country. Mr A. Dimitropoulos, director of the Industrial Exhibits Institute, gives us his own --and the government's -- opinion about the advisability of his exhibit:

"It has as its basis the interest of the Ministry of National Defense so that officers might become informed on the latest achievements in defense technology without spending foreign exchange for sending groups of officers abroad to attend similar exhibits.

"The expanding Greek war industry can cover the armaments needs of the Greek armed forces with about one year's production. Therefore, it must also engage in export business, and this exhibit serves exactly these views of the Greek war industry."

Mr Dimitropoulos reveals to us that the three leading war industries in Greece are presently the EAV, EVO /Greek Weapons Industry/ and "Stager Hellas." Besides these industries there are another approximately 15 which can make so-called finished products, while another approximately 25 satellite industries can undertake subcontracting parts in industry.

#### What Happened at the Exhibit?

Mr Dimitropoulos, in reality, initiated us willingly to a few secrets of his work and of the exhibit. War industries of the following 19 countries took part in the exhibit:

Greece, United States, Great Britain, FRG, France, Italy, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Canada, Brazil, Spain, South Korea, Austria and Singapore.

The Greek Government had invited 28 countries, mainly from the Middle and Far East and Africa, all expenses paid for their delegations. The following 21 countries accepted the invitation:

Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Malta, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, India, Jordan, Morocco, Cyprus, Cameroon and Argentina.

However, as a good organizer of such exhibits (where the adepts taking part "are fully specialized individuals, namely officers and war industries specialists"), Mr Dimitropoulos does not provide further revelations:

"You cannot learn what sales were made during the exhibit or what agreements concluded because their announcement would reveal defense secrets of the country doing the purchasing. Besides, secrecy is always a part of the agreement being signed...."

Subject of Atmosphere!

"For that reason," he continued, "the public was not permitted entry. You understand that all these specialists gathered at this place to explain to others the characteristics of their products, while others concluded agreements. The issue of prohibiting entry had nothing to do with the security of the public, given the fact that all the exhibits were, of course, unloaded or were models. However, imagine if you will a pensioner showing up at the exhibit and asking "What is this and what is that...?" It would ruin the atmosphere which was completely...professional."

Nevertheless, he did add the following: "Agreements were concluded for tens of millions of dollars. Think that our small-average industry concluded agreements equal to 11 million dollars, an insignificant sum compared to agreements of a big industry. Think also about how many agreements are now being worked out by reason of this exhibit. It suffices to tell you that usually in such exhibits not even one-tenth of the final agreements are concluded because, as you can understand, a person does not look at a tank model and say, "Give me 20 of those."

Trojan Horse

However, the most revealing point in our conversation with Mr Dimitropoulos was the one related to the role of our country in the international market of the euph mystically-called "defense systems." He said:

"The countries that have achieved high technology (read: imperialist and developed capitalist) do not have the good relations we have with the Arab World. We, therefore, with these excellent relations, can channel products of these countries which in the future can be produced --some are already being produced-- in our country. This will be done with the conclusion of relevant agreements between us and these developed countries...."

Indeed, he brought up the example of EAV which, as he said, is not an industry for the servicing of Greek aircraft but a "service" base for the entire Mediterranean. He added, "In order to understand, it suffices for me to tell you that aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force are being serviced by EAV and, of course, we are collecting such a large sum from that that we can say that EAV can live for a long time with it."

Of course, each gentleman who participates in the armaments game can see this as natural --as a "job" like any other one. He can even visualize our country as a middleman of the Western trusts of disaster or even as a self-powered weapons systems exporting country.

However, can the same hold true for a country that maintains that it is socialist and peace loving? Can such a government agree to participate in such a dangerous game which is pushing it deeper into the stifling yoke of international imperialism?

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MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

CADET RESIGNATION--First-year cadet Papaiordanis resigned yesterday from the Military Academy. As is known, he was punished with a 20-day imprisonment following the incident he had with the academy's superintendent. According to press reports a second cadet resigned because he was denied permission to go the National Resistance Festival at Gorgopotamos on 25 November. /Text/ /Athens  
TA NEA in Greek 16 Nov 82 p 17 7520

CSO: 3521/85

## NEUTRALITY POLICY ASSUMPTIONS BEING DEBATED FOLLOWING U 137

Stockholm 7 DAGAR In Swedish 5 Nov 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Lars Killander]

[Text] Spokesmen for Sweden's naval command stood day after day in the drill hall of Berga's naval school and answered the press' questions on possible and probable submarines, actual contacts and the encroachment of Swedish territory by a "foreign power." A few of the foreign journalists smiled. A well thought-out formula was involved when the military described the situation. The Swedes must be neutral at any cost.

The eyes of the world turned on Sweden after the intense but fruitless search for the submarine in Harsfjard 1 year after the unusual grounding of the U 137 in Bekinge. In connection with the Harsfjard incident the debate on security and neutrality gathered so much speed that the Social Democratic government used all its power to assure both Sweden's own citizens and the world that Sweden's neutrality remains firmly in place.

Olof Palme, at a press conference at the end of October when the government announced stronger measures against foreign submarines, criticized those groups in Sweden who were using the ill-fated submarine hunt as a pretext to question Sweden's policy of neutrality. To question neutrality was, according to Palme, a sign of a lack of patriotism.

'Discuss It Openly'

The question is whether Palme's comments were not a typical Swedish way of coating the neutrality question with a guilt complex. His comments do not encourage an open debate, and an open debate on neutrality is what some foreign observers say Sweden needs.

"After the Harsfjard incident you Swedes must remove the straight jacket you have put on the neutrality debate. You must discuss the question openly and remove the stamp of divine doctrine which the policy of neutrality possesses," says John Frickson, professor at Edinburgh University and an expert on Soviet affairs. He believes that political and military changes close to Sweden make our neutrality concept outmoded.



"Two questions must be answered in an open and frank debate. One is: What does Sweden need to do to maintain a credible policy of neutrality, and the other: What are the consequences of Sweden's neutrality," Erickson says.

Political and military changes have transformed the so-called Northern flank (that is, the Nordic countries) into a part of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's central front in Europe. The designation Northern flank is inaccurate, according to Erickson, since the word flank creates the impression of an insignificant geographic entity.

According to the Edinburgh professor, we must be prepared for a new kind of warfare which we did not consider earlier. Instead of a nuclear attack or a full-scale conventional attack against Sweden, a future war in the country would concentrate on sabotage, attacks by small units on important places and the disruption of supply and transport lines.

#### Test of Preparedness

"That is the pattern I see in connection with the repeated U-boat incidents," Erickson informs 7 DAGAR. "I place the theory that a foreign power is investigating the Swedish archipelago for military reasons way down on the scale of probability. Rather, it is a matter of testing Swedish preparedness and power, thus pure political measures," according to Erickson.

The geopolitical significance of the North has increased in connection with the introduction of cruise missile technique and the possibility of launching these from ships and planes in the Nordic area. The cruise missiles enroute to their goal must pass over Swedish territory among others. This means that it is essential for the superpowers to control Sweden in order to place control and communication installations in our country.

It is difficult to detect cruise missiles by ordinary radar because they fly low, but both superpowers have so-called over-the-horizon radar which would be a useful instrument to place in Sweden and thereby lengthen the warning time for incoming cruise missiles.

"Moreover," John Erickson maintains, "Sweden's neutrality is in Soviet eyes questionable. According to military journals, the Soviets expect that the important strategic airfields which Sweden possesses will be used by NATO in case of war.

"Consequently, the policy of neutrality must be revalued and adapted to the technological and political changes. I do not mean at all that Sweden should join any alliance," Erickson says. "That would convert a relatively stable situation in the North into a completely catastrophic, unstable situation."

"Neutrality is a sacred cow," a security expert says to 7 DAGAR. "A person who brings up the neutrality policy is regarded as unreliable. The question is too sensitive. No one dares discuss neutrality since it would jeopardize one's career.

"I believe we should formulate our security policy in the following manner: Nonalignment in peacetime with the objective of maintaining our political independence and territorial integrity in war," says 7 DAGAR's informant.

Armed neutrality with the emphasis more on armed than on neutrality is perhaps the best way to achieve that goal. But neutrality is not a goal in itself as Sweden's doctrine suggests. If Sweden were attacked by a foreign power, it would not be neutrality we would defend but Sweden's territory. If we must defend ourselves, neutrality is at an end by definition or according to international law. We are then at war.

#### Debate on a Higher Level

The debate in Sweden on security has reached a higher level because of the U-boat incidents, according to Arne Olav Brundtland, a researcher at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute in Oslo. He does not agree that the Swedes have their heads in the sand when neutrality is discussed.

"The debate is not as minor as it may appear but there is no loud opposition to the policy being followed," Brundtland says.

He believes that there was greater unity regarding neutrality in Sweden during the 50's, 60's and 70's, while the Norwegians have always been more divided regarding their security policies. Brundtland makes a distinction between a security policy which he believes an allied state like Norway formulates and a neutrality policy which an unaligned state like Sweden follows.

"Sweden has not faced the same challenges as Norway has experienced," Brundtland continues, "partly because of its geographic situation and partly through its NATO membership. In Sweden you earlier discussed how defense should look--a hard defense exterior or 'tough men.' Norway has instead discussed the size of the defense budget and thus questioned the total defense in a different manner than Sweden.

"Our confidence in Sweden's defense capability is still good," Brundtland says in addition. "Relatively, the defense establishment has been weakened and thereby the ability to follow a strong neutrality policy. But we must remember that it is after all a modest reduction. The substance of Swedish defense is still substantial," Brundtland says.

No nation officially questions Sweden's defense capability or ability to maintain its neutrality. Confidence in our defense capability is said to be unchanged in officials circles in America.

#### Do You Doubt It Yourself?

Foreign journalists whom 7 DAGAR has contacted agree with this judgement. One of them, Kim Rogal, foreign editor of the weekly magazine NEWSWEEK, says that it seems that the Swedes have a bad conscience.

"It seems that you yourselves doubt your own defense capability, since you appear to believe that the world around you is suddenly reevaluating the policy you are following," Kim Rogal says. "Since you are dramatizing the reaction of the world around you, you perhaps have a bad conscience.

"I know that none of the NEWSWEEK reporters doubt your ability to give tit for tat. We gave Harsfjard comparatively heavy coverage. It would have been of course more spectacular from the journalistic viewpoint if you had succeeded in getting up the U-boat in the fjord. We were ready for a long time to put such news on the first page, but since no U-boat came up, we naturally toned down the reporting," Rogal says.

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## PRIVILEGES OF ATHENS AMERICAN SCHOOL WITHDRAWN

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 9 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Levt. Gyras]

[Excerpt] Discriminations in favor of the Athens American School are coming to an end. For the second time, KEME [Center for Educational Research and Training] has rejected the school's proposal for making its lyceum's four years equivalent to the Greek lyceums' three years. It decided that it is not democratic--and, even more, socialistic--to violate the principle of equal opportunity for entry into the supreme schools with an unequal contest between graduates of a lyceum lasting four years--like the Athens School--and students from three-year public lyceums.

KEME proposed to the appropriate deputy minister of education that the two schools be made completely equal, with three years of study for both, and the possibility of keeping--if so desired--the fourth-year class which will be classified as collegiate in the future and will be independent of the lyceum. That is, a student completing his school's third-year class could take part in panhellenic examinations irregardless of whether he will later wish to attend the fourth-year collegiate class.

Mr Kakridis

It should be noted in particular that the rejected proposal for the school's request was put to KEME by Professor F. Kakridis who, as is known, himself graduated from the Athens American School and knows its operation well. It is pointed out, moreover, that not even one KEME adviser was found to argue on behalf of the proposal of the school's Administrative Council. Furthermore, a former KEME decision was also against this privilege, but the deputy minister of education at that time, Vas. Kondogiannopoulos, took no notice of it.

A problem is being created presently among the school's students because the school's administration, without waiting for the Ministry of Education's approval, applied a new method of making the lyceum's four classes equivalent with the Greek school by overloading the second-year class. The students of this class recently abstained from attending their class.

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## SECURITY POLICE INCREASING PHONE TAPS AGAINST ESPIONAGE

Stockholm 7 DAGAR in Swedish 5 Nov 82 p 10

[Article by Arne Konig]

[Text] The Swedish security police annually listens to some 25,000 hours of telephone conversations in Stockholm alone. Bengt Hamdahl in a report from the attorney general gives for the first time a picture as to how extensive the telephone taps of the security police are.

Twenty-four hours a day the police operate tape recorders in a special recording room in the National Police headquarters on Kungsholm in Stockholm.

The security police are supposed to be involved only with questions touching the nation's security, that is, primarily different kinds of espionage.

But in addition to the security police's surveillance there is that for which the criminal police are responsible. That involves most often narcotic crimes or other serious crimes. The criminal police listen to 5,000-6,000 hours a year in Stockholm.

Telephone monitoring in regard to narcotic surveillance has increased greatly in recent years. About some 50 cases a year were involved in the 70's. In 1980 it was 220.

But it is the security police's monitoring which require great resources in money, time and personnel.

#### This Is How It Works

Since most of the conversations monitored are in a foreign language, the translators must always be available to the police. Every day between 75 and 100 1-hour tapes are given to the interpreters for translating and transcription.

The security police obtain permission from the court to initiate monitoring. The court, in this case a chief counselor, evaluates a request from the so-called espionage prosecutor in Stockholm, K. G. Svensson.

K. G. Svensson obtains permission. He communicates this to the security police who immediately call the telephone system's contact man. He sees to it that the telephone is connected to the police recording room so it can be monitored.

Three policemen work in this room. They man the recorders. In addition to these three, five other policemen who work at night have access to the room.

The police in the recording room are not supposed to know to whose phone they are listening. All the monitored individuals are given a code number on the tape records in Kungsholm.

After the telephone company connects the phone to be monitored, the recording is automatic. When the phone is lifted off the hook, Miss Time is connected, and the date and the exact time is registered on the tape recorder which immediately starts to operate. It stops when the phone is put down.

The tape is demagnetized so it can be used again after it has been translated and the transcriptions are ready. But some conversations and voices are considered so important that they are played onto permanent tapes for eventual use in the future.

A considerable amount of so-called extraneous information is obtained from this activity, information which does not have anything to do with the investigation in question. This material can be around for years. It can also pop up in completely unexpected situations.

An example is a monitored conversation regarding lawyer Henning Sjostrom's alleged mafia contacts which appeared in the newspaper FIB-AKTUELLT.

"The question of superfluous information has not caused any problems for the security division. One saves the information which is needed, so matters under consideration can be followed up," Bengt Hamdahl asserts.

#### Stockholm Dominates

Is there any reason to be concerned about the extent of telephone monitoring?

"No, I don't think so. Its extent is relatively large, to be sure, but it is still not gigantic."

Only the security police know how extensive it is in other parts of the country. Bengt Hamdahl does not dare venture a guess.

"Stockholm is completely dominating in this situation. Certain situations exist only here."

The attorney general made his report after a normal inspection of the police, the telephone company, the courts and the authorities involved with monitoring. The visits to the authorities were made during the spring. The



attorney general made some comments in his report about some minor flaws in how the monitorings were conducted.

Otherwise the attorney general does not see that there is any reason for criticism.

"No, I made a rather thorough investigation. The telephone monitoring is done in such a way that the rights of the individual are protected," Bengt Hamdahl says.

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